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This dissertation is a collection of three independent essays
in Applied Economics, Migration and Conflict. Chapter 2 fo-
cuses on the interconnectedness between labour market divi-
sion, economic rents concentration, political extremism, and
ethnic conflict. A natural experiment of history that occurred
in the late 1960s in South Tyrol, a northernmost and predomi-
nantly German-speaking region of Italy, is exploited to inves-
tigate whether frictions in the labour market may induce a
move in the voting preferences of a privileged minority group
towards a more extremist political party. Chapter 3 builds
on propositions from Latané’s Dynamic Social Impact Theory
(Latané, 1981, 1996) to analyse the evolution and diffusion
of anti-immigrant attitudes across European NUTS2 regions
between 2002 and 2014. The identification of a spatially de-
pendent diffusion and clustering process of anti-immigrant
attitudes has a significant bearing for the understanding of
the rise and fall of populist movements across Europe and
changing electoral support for xenophobic parties across Eu-
ropean regions over time. The last chapter explores the extent
to which scientific migration and mobility barriers shape pro-




Fluere is a Latin verb used to indicate a flow of any animated or unanimated
object. The flowing of any such object carries along information and brings about
changes to both departure and destination environments. This work is made up
of three essays, each dealing to a broader or lesser extent with a very particu-
lar case of flow, the one where the objects are humans: migration. Humans (i)
carry information along the journey -their costumes, principles and actions; and
(ii) bring about changes -departure and destination environments have to rear-
range and adapt until a new equilibrium state is reached. Both points (i) and (ii)
represent the figurative cornerstones and physical boundaries of this work, the
abstraction level of which is set by the econometric techniques used to evaluate
documented historical happenings and measurable changing quantities.
............... T...............
The international migrant population has grown markedly in scale
over the past four-and-a-half decades. In 2015, a total of 244 million peo-
ple was living in a country other than their country of birth, a three-
time higher figure than the 84 million estimated in 1970, with Asia and
Europe hosting more than half of the global international migrant stock
(IOM (2017)). Such a steep rise in the share of foreign-born people has
posed major policy challenges for countries around the globe, involving
employment, education, housing, social services, and national security,
inter alia.
Migrant inflows have been increasingly perceived and thought of as
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representing a threat to the economic, cultural, and social status quo
and future prospects. Governments have been implementing tighter im-
migration policies, even in traditionally more liberal and open contexts
such as Sweden, where on 21 June 2016, the Swedish Parliament adopted
legislative changes that introduced a temporary 3-year (13-month) resi-
dence permit for those granted refugee (subsidiary protection) status and
limited remarkably the possibilities of asylum seekers to be reunited with
their families. Political parties with anti-immigrant actions at the core of
their agendas have been gaining broader electoral consensus. In the 2014
General election, the Sverigedemokraterna became Sweden’s third biggest
party, securing almost 13% of the electoral favours; the Dansk Folkeparti
in Denmark won 21.1% of the vote in 2015, almost doubling its support
since the previous 2011 general election and, in 2015, the Schweizerische
Volkspartei obtained a record 29.4% of the vote in Switzerland. More re-
cently, in the presidential election in Austria, the candidate of the Freedom
Party of Austria, Norbert Hofer, won 48% of votes and, in October 2017,
the same party secured 51 seats (out of 183) in the Austrian Parliament.
The rise in international migration coupled with the natives’ per-
ception of enhanced hostility towards immigrants and the recent shifts
in many countries towards tighter immigration policies and increasing
electoral support for more extremist political parties have all triggered
a resurgence of interest in exploring determinants, processes, and out-
comes of people moving across and within national boundaries. Econ-
omists have traditionally focused on investigating theoretically and em-
pirically the impact of immigration on the labour market and welfare
system in receiving countries: do immigrants take jobs away from na-
tives and reduce their wages? Since immigrants pay taxes and use pub-
lic services in many forms (including public education and healthcare,
public safety, public spaces such as roads, parks and recreation facilities,
and various types of welfare assistance), are they net contributors or net
recipients of benefits of the welfare state? Most empirical studies have
detected slightly positive or non-existent average effects of immigration
on natives’ wage and employment levels, although natives with skill en-
dowments similar to those of the newcomers have been found to exhibit
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a higher degree of vulnerability (see, e.g., Borjas (2014); D’ Amuri and
Peri (2014); Dustmann et al. (2012); Manacorda et al. (2012); Ottaviano
and Peri (2012)). It has been also documented that in the short-run, de-
pending on how quickly the economy and the labour demand adjust to
immigration-induced labour supply shocks, wage and employment can
be impacted negatively (see, e.g., Borjas (2017); Borjas and Monras (2017);
Hunt (1992)). As for the immigration-public finances nexus, the evidence
is mixed and heavily reliant on the approach (static accounting or dy-
namic) used and the relative assumptions made (see, e.g., Bonin (2006);
Bonin et al. (2000); Dustmann and Frattini (2014); Liebig and Mo (2013)).
More recently, scholars have also devoted a great deal of attention
to establishing causal links between immigration and variables such as
crime, terrorism, and political outcomes. Unlike common perceptions,
migrant inflows have not been reported to induce terrorist attacks (Bove
(2016)) or to affect overall crime rates (Bianchi et al. (2012)); rather, they
have been found to only increase the incidence of particular types of
crime (Bell et al. (2013); Spenkuch (2013)). As for the political outcomes,
it has been documented that changes in the share of immigrants cause a
significant increase in the share of votes or seats secured by anti-immigrant
nationalist parties (see, e.g., Becker et al. (2016a); Halla et al. (2017a); Har-
mon (2017); Otto and Steinhardt (2014)).
Although independent of one another, each of the three essays this
work is made up of touches either marginally or to a deeper extent some
peculiar yet characterizing sides (and relevant facets for our times) of the
complex migration phenomenon. In chapter 2, migration is a mere in-
strument to address an endogeneity issue related to people’s settlement
choice that arises when empirically investigating the interconnectedness
between labour market division, economic rents concentration, politi-
cal extremism, and ethnic conflict. To successfully implement its pro-
gramme to denationalise South Tyrol and the South Tyrolese, the fascist
regime relied heavily on incentivizing massive movements of workers
and their families from other Italian regions to South Tyrol through de-
velopment of industrial zones and construction of public houses. We
exploit the resulting steep increase in the number of registrations at the
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Registry Office for change of residence from another Italian municipality
that occurred from 1932 onwards to recover exogenous variation from an
endogenous regressor (the share of Italians residing in South Tyrolean
municipalities) and establish a causal link between this regressor and
changes in the electoral support for a right-wing post-fascist party. The
instrument represents, however, only a small ingredient within a wide
non-migration-related context. The Chapter studies how and to what ex-
tent political attitudes of ethnic minorities change when a majority group
threatens their established economic rents. We exploit a natural experi-
ment of history that occurred in the late 1960s in South Tyrol, a north-
ernmost and predominantly German-speaking region of Italy. During
the 1930s, the region underwent a massive process of Italianization that
strengthened markedly entry barriers into public offices for the German-
relative to the Italian speaking population. Because of their comparative
advantage, Italians specialized as public servants and settled sparsely
across South Tyrolean municipalities to cover public posts. By 1939 more
than 95% of all public posts were in the hands of Italians, although Ger-
man speakers accounted for 75% of the total population. This ethnic di-
vision of the labour market, however, was brought back to question in
1966 by a reform package that aimed at redistributing jobs in the pub-
lic administration sector proportionally to the numerosity of each lan-
guage group. Following the announcement of the reform, we document:
(i) an increase in the vote share of the post-fascist party in the general
elections; (ii) a higher support for the post-fascist party in those munic-
ipalities where Italians were fewer; and (iii) an even higher support for
the post-fascist party in those municipalities where Italians were more
specialized as public officers. As of point (ii), since the political structure
of the municipalities might drive the settlement of the Italian-speaking
population, we further instrument for the Italian share of the population
with migration inflows from neighbouring Italian regions in the 1930s,
the number of housing units built in the 1919-1945 period, and an in-
dicator of the municipalities served by stations along the Brenner rail-
way route. We interpret the results as evidence of members of a minor-
ity group developing political extremist preferences when fearing to lose
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their historically-established economic rents. Results appear very robust
to potential alternative mechanisms -specialization of Italians in other ac-
tivity sectors, terrorist attacks, and relative income considerations.
Conversely, both chapter 3 and chapter 4 take migration up as their
core theme. Chapter 3 focuses on Europeans’ attitudes towards migrants.
Europe has become a major destination for international migrants. By
2015, 34.3 million people living in an EU member state were born outside
of the EU-28, and an additional 18.5 million persons had been born in
another EU country than the one currently residing in (Eurostat). We ex-
plore the extent to which anti-immigrant hostility is spatially dependent
and has spread geographically across European regions. Based on data
from seven rounds (2002-2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS), anal-
ysed at sub-national (NUTS 2 regions) levels, and exploiting propositions
of the Dynamic Social Impact Theory, we identify a significant spatial
connectivity of anti-immigrant attitudes by showing that spatially more
proximate European regions share similar in trends in anti-immigrant
attitudes than we observe between more distant regions. Our spatial-
lag baseline model specification predicts that a one percentage point in-
crease in the percentage of respondents with hostile attitudes against im-
migrants of the same race or ethnicity as the majority population in spa-
tially more proximate regions raises the percentage of respondents with
similar anti-immigrant attitudes in the reference region by 0.480 percent-
age points. The identification of a spatially dependent diffusion and clus-
tering process of anti-immigrant attitudes has significant bearing for the
understanding of the rise and fall of populist movements across Europe
and changing electoral support for xenophobic parties across European
regions over time.
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between academic mobility, inter-
national research collaborations and mobility barriers. International re-
search collaborations have been growing notably, both in magnitude and
relevance, over the last decades favoured by the introduction and spread
of new transportation and communication technologies. E-mail, fax ma-
chines, the Internet, (multi-point) video conferencing, cheap flights have
all made interactions between researchers far easier, even when sepa-
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rated by great distances. Despite this, physical co-location is still identi-
fied as a critical factor in facilitating the transfer and exchange of (tacit)
knowledge through face-to-face interaction and informal communica-
tion. Close spatial proximity, however, is not always possible to attain.
The ability of researchers from different countries to temporarily colocate
depends heavily on such factors as travel barriers that might severely
condition their mobility. We specifically test hypotheses on the role of sci-
entific mobility and visa policy in influencing patterns of international re-
search collaborations proxied by the number of internationally co-autho-
red publications. By using bibliometric data from Elsevier’s Scopus data-
base, we track international flows of scientists migrating between institu-
tions in more than 194 countries and record international research collab-
orations between 1973 and 2013. Through Poisson maximum likelihood
estimation of structural gravity-type models, we find strong evidence
that both scientific mobility and visa restrictions shape the emergence









A large strand of literature has been documenting how ethnic conflicts
generate economic losses, political distortion, weak institutions, and cor-
ruption (Blattman and Miguel (2010); Easterly and Levine (1997); Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)). Several authors have focused on their
determinants, with some pointing out cultural factors (Voigtländer and
Voth (2015)), while others scrutinizing their economic roots (Becker et al.
(2016b); Grosfeld et al. (2017)). In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental
design to investigate whether frictions in the labor market prompt salience
in the ethnic conflict and induce a shift in voting towards extremist po-
litical platforms in a privileged minority group.
We document a unique natural experiment of history that occurred
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in the 1960s in South Tyrol, a northernmost and predominantly German-
speaking region of Italy. After its annexation to Italy in 1919, South Tyrol
underwent a massive process of Italianization that banned the use of Ger-
man and arose legal barriers in the labor market for public officers. Be-
cause of their comparative advantage in speaking the official language,
Italian specialized as public servants and, except for the biggest towns,
settled sparsely across Tyrolean municipalities to cover public posts. The
resulting ethnic division of labour was brought back to question in the
late 1960s by the announcement of a new reform package that was aimed
at redistributing jobs in the public administration sector proportionally
to the numerosity of each language group.
We empirically investigate how a sparse minority, highly specialized
in the labor market, reacts to the panic that broke out after the announce-
ment of a reform that was likely to erode its economic rents. Following
the announcement of the reform (but before its full implementation), we
document: (i) an increase in the vote share in the General elections to
the Lower Chamber of Deputies for the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI),
a post-fascist party that had as main goal the defence of the Italianness, in
municipalities where the reform was likely to redistribute public posts;
(ii) a higher support for the MSI in municipalities where Italians were
fewer; and (iii) an even higher support for the MSI in municipalities
where Italians were more specialized as public officers.
To document these facts, we combine data on anti-Germans polit-
ical preferences of the Italian group, linguistic groups composition of
the population, and a wide set of information regarding the occupa-
tion in the labor market of each linguistic group. In our baseline anal-
ysis we employ a standard difference-in-differences strategy and exploit
two sources of variation. First, following international pressures and a
ten-year period of terrorist attacks, in 1966 the Italian government re-
sumed negotiations with Austria and proposed an all-inclusive reform
offer, the so-called “Package”, that was aimed to grant a large amount
of autonomy to the region and more rights to the German group. Sec-
ond, we exploit the difference in the population composition between
South Tyrol and the Trentino region. Despite being both part of the
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Austrian-Hungarian Empire prior to the annexation to Italy in 1919, the
Trentino was entirely populated by Italians. As soon as the two areas
were added to Italy, they were merged onto forming the twentieth Ital-
ian region, named as Trentino-Alto Adige. While the “Package” also in-
volved Trentino—they split the region Trentino-Alto Adige into two au-
tonomous provinces, the province of Trent and that of Bolzano—they
were unlikely to redistribute established economic rents to members of
other ethnic groups, as Germans were practically absent. In our base-
line estimation, we therefore compare the relative change in the vote
share of the Italians to the MSI in the post-announcement period of the
“Package” relative to the pre-announcement period between municipal-
ities that were likely to be affected (i.e., those in South Tyrol) and those
that were unlikely to be affected (i.e., those in Trentino).
An important premise to our analysis is that the South Tyrolean ques-
tion was a conflict preponderantly conducted by the two central gov-
ernments of Rome and Vienna. Vienna pushed for the re-annexation of
Bolzano to the rest of Tyrol, one of the largest Austrian region in its west-
ern side; Rome claimed that Bolzano would remain in Italian hands as
the “natural” border of the country was the Alpine arch.1 The evolution
of the conflict strictly follows the distribution of political power between
Austria and Italy. As long as Austria remained divided among the Ally
forces (United States, United Kingdom, France, and Soviet Union) the
South Tyrolean question did not come out. When Austria regained inde-
pendence in 1955, Vienna began to claim Bolzano back. As the Italian an-
swer was firmly negative, German-speaking South Tyroleans organized
themselves in terrorist groups with the intention to let the question be
included on the Italian political agenda.2 The terrorist wave lasted for
more than 15 years. Official reports count 288 terrorist attacks between
1956 and 1974, 94% of which occurring in the province of Bolzano, and 19
1 South Tyrol is also referred to as Cisalpine Tyrol, while the rest of Tyrol is also known
as Transalpine Tyrol.
2 According to the official reports (see the Elenco delle sentenze per fatti di terrorismo dal
1956 al 1988, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Bolzano), Italian Courts sen-
tenced 157 terrorists of which 103 South Tyroleans, 40 Austrian citizens, and 14 German
citizens (of the Federal Republic of Germany).
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deads among Italians. The reply of Rome was harsh and Austria could
not enter the European Economic Community because of the Italian veto.
The escalation of the terror led the newly elected Italian Prime Minister
Aldo Moro to commit to a solution of the South Tyrolean question begin-
ning with the 1966 that eventually leads to the adoption of the “Package”
in 1972.
Our baseline estimates show that after the announcement of the “Pack-
age” Italians living in South Tyrol increase on average their support for
the MSI, relative to those living in Trentino, of 4.15 percentage points—
about 56% of the average MSI vote share in the two regions. However,
we argue and document that this result masks two sources of hetero-
geneity. First, as Figure 1 illustrates, Italians’ settlement across Tyrolean
villages was substantially various. We document that this spatial distri-
bution was the result of legal barriers to public offices imposed on the
German-speaking population during the Italianization of the region. In
line with a story of concentration of economic rents we then show that,
after the announcement of the “Package”, anti-Germans political pref-
erences increased the most in municipalities where Italians were fewer.
To establish causality, we exploit exogenous variation in the Italian set-
tlement by collecting data from the fascist epoch when the Italianization
process of the South Tyrol had its start. First, we assemble data on the
migration inflows from the neighbouring Italian provinces during the
thirties. Second, we use information of the number of housing units built
by the fascist regime for Italians’ settlement purposes. We then comple-
ment this information with data on the route of the pre-existent Austrian
railway, built at the end of the nineteenth century to connect Italy and
Austria. The 2SLS estimations are negative and significant and larger
than those obtained using OLS.
The second source of heterogeneity we use to uncover the effect of
the panic that broke out after the announcement of the “Package” on the
rise of anti-German attitudes is the spatial distribution in the share of
public servants among Italians. As Figure 2 illustrates, Italians special-
ized as public servants in the smallest Tyrolean villages, at the northern
boundary of the region, where more than half of them was employed
10
in the public administration. We show that this variation explains the
entire shift in anti-Germans attitudes that we obtained in the difference-
in-differences estimation. This result is extremely robust to the inclusion
of a large number of controls as well as on using alternative measures
of concentration in the labor market. Moreover, we test potential mech-
anisms, alternative to the above explanation. We provide evidence that
variation in the exposure to terrorist attacks or in the relative income of
ethnic groups cannot explain the rise of anti-German attitudes after the
announcement of the “Package”.
To see why frictions in the labor market for public servants became
salient in late 1960s so as to induce extremism in anti-German attitudes
and an increase in the support for the MSI, Figure 3 scatters South Ty-
rolean municipalities according to the share of public servants among
Italians (in y-axis) and the share of Italians (in the x-axis) as reported in
the Census of 1961. The Italianization of the South Tyrol produces per-
sistent distortions in the public servants labor market in favor of Italians
that were still at work after thirty years and after the dissolution of the
Fascist regime and the birth of the Italian Republic. In municipalities
where Italians were only the 20% of the total population, for instance,
they highly specialized and, in some cases, more than 80% of them oc-
cupied a public post. The announcement of the “Package” in 1966 put
at risk their historically established economic rents. The “Package”, in
fact, by proposing a redistribution of posts in the public administration
sector proportionally to the numerosity of each language group, was to
move the distribution downward up to the 45-degree line were public
post proportional to the numerosity of each linguistic group with a con-
sequent economic loss for the Italian group. Our estimates imply that
municipalities with a standard deviation above the mean in the share of
public servants among Italians increase their support for the MSI by 3.72
percentage points after the announcement of the “Package” (but before
its implementation). We interpret this result as evidence of the salience
of ethnic conflict when institutional changes induce competition between








Figure 1: Spatial distribution of the Italian language group across South






Figure 2: Spatial distribution of public servants among Italians across South
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Figure 3: Shares of public servants among Italians and share of Italians in
South Tyrolean municipalities in 1961.
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Our paper primarily connects with a young literature on labor divi-
sion and ethnic conflict. Becker et al. (2016b) and Grosfeld et al. (2017)
have documented the spark of violence between members of different
ethnic groups when historically ethnic divisions in the labor market are
subjected to variation at some point in time. Both papers show a rise in
pogroms and anti-Jews attitudes in Europe following the Protestant Ref-
ormation that induced friction in the money-lending sector (Becker et al.
(2016b)) or in periods that combined economic shocks with political un-
certainty (Grosfeld et al. (2017)). As we specifically look at the voting
behavior of Italians, we also connect to a large literature on Immigration,
ethnic diversity, and voting (Barone et al. (2016); Becker et al. (2016a);
Colussi et al. (2016); Halla et al. (2017b); Mayda et al. (2016)).
We contribute to it in several ways. First, our analysis shows how
conflict and political extremism may break out even if economic resources
are relatively abundant—South Tyrol is a rich and developed region and
the climax of extremism occurred in a period of relative prosperity.3 This
is at odd with much of the literature that often studies ethnic conflict in
poor or developing countries or in historical periods prior to the indus-
trial revolution. Secondly, it documents a shift in political attitudes of
a small-scale, geographical sparse minority—the Italian group. This is
often empirically challenging and the evidence of political attitudes of
ethnic minorities is scarce, despite having frequently been the target of
violence. Minorities are, in fact, often unlikely to pour into the streets
and protest as they fear to be harshly repressed by the majority. They are
unlikely to organize themselves in political movements as they generally
have limited political rights guaranteed. Furthermore, due to their small-
scale size, they are scarcely represented in the political arena, which pre-
vents the observation of a potential source of political attitudes elicita-
tion. The Italian group, while a minority in South Tyrol, was well repre-
sented in the country and could resort to a wide array of political tools
to defend their economic privileges. Finally, despite the Italian political
3 South Tyrol is the richest region among the Italian regions—its gross domestic pro-
duction per capita has been 43,400 Euro in 2016, about 15,000 percentage points above the
Italian mean as well as 2,000 Euro above the Austrian mean.
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system was highly polarized between Christian Democrats and Commu-
nists, a small post-fascist party, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), had
as main goal the defence of the Italianness; its vote share can be thus used
to measure changes in the anti-German attitudes of Italians in South Ty-
rol.
Our analysis also shows that terrorist attacks did not change anti-
German attitudes of Italians (as, for example, in Montalvo (2011)), but
were successful in inducing the Italian government to make concessions
to the German group. In this respect, we connect with Gould and Klor
(2010) who documented this finding in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we
describe the major events that occurred in the region starting from the
Italianization process that gave rise to a distorted labor market for public
servants. Section 2.3 describes the data, while in Section 2.4 we discuss
our empirical strategy and present the baseline results. In Section 2.5 we
exploit heterogeneity in the Italian settlement. In Section 2.6 we docu-
ment our main argument using data from the labor market. Section 2.7
tests for alternative mechanisms that might explain our results. Section
2.8 concludes.
2.2 Historical background
The history of South Tyrol is particularly rich of events and discontinu-
ities. Because of its enviable geographical position, Germans, Italians,
and French put their eyes on it. The land, in fact, was the door to the
most strategic and commercial point over the Alps: the Brenner pass. It
was located just 1000 meters above the sea level, thus being considerably
lower than the alternative Swiss ones. The snow melted earlier in the
Spring and traffic could be resumed much quicker. Romans built upon
it a strategic route, the Via Claudia Augusta, for both military conquests
and the preservation of the Pax Romana. In the Middle Age, this posi-
tion favored its economic expansion as an important commercial region
that Italians and Germans exploited to buy and sell artisan products. Po-
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litically, the wealth of bishoprics and counties were eventually unified
by the local nobility into the unique county of Tyrol that had, in turn,
been acquired by the Habsburg dynasty in 1363. Five centuries later,
the Austrian-Hungarian empire had also annexed the bishopric of Trent
(1805) to Tyrol. This status quo remained unchanged until the end of the
WWI and the declaration of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919)
when South Tyrol and Trentino passed to Italy.
The remainder of this section summarizes the main political events
following the annexation of the South Tyrol to Italy. Since we compare
the election results in the post World War II period with the period fol-
lowing the introduction of the “Package”, we first provide an overview
the history of South Tyrol’s Italianization that follows its annexation to
Italy and the advent of Fascism in the peninsula. We then turn to the post
World War II conflict between Austria and Italy and to a detailed descrip-
tion of the “Package” reform and its implications for the labor market. A
more detailed and comprehensive history of the South Tyrol is provided
in Alcock (1970) and Steininger (2003).
2.2.1 The Italianization of the South Tyrol
As the WWI came to an end, the Habsburg-Hungarian Empire saw its
dissolution. Following the adoption of the Woodrow Wilson’s self-deter-
mination principle, Austria and Hungary were redefined as small land-
locked states. The newly established Republic of Austria lost around
60% of the old Austrian Empire’s territory, including South Tyrol and
Trentino, both promised to Italy in the secret Treaty of London of 1915 as
the prize to change side and go to war against Austria and Germany, its
former allies.4
Despite the annexation of South Tyrol, Trento, and Trieste, resent-
ments spread all over Italy for the unsatisfactory conditions that the coun-
4 At the outbreak of the WWI, Italy initially maintained a neutral position, despite her
alliance with the Central Empires, Germany and Austria. Besides being militarily unpre-
pared to engage in a war, Italy was also profoundly divided over the subject. However,
in 1915 the government began negotiations with the Allies claiming the annexation of
“Cisalpine Tyrol, following the geographical and natural frontier (the Brenner) . . . ” (Salandra
(1932)). The treaty was signed in London on April 26th, 1915.
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try had obtained in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919.5 Italians
had sacrified countless lives during the WWI and there were concerns
that awarding too much autonomy to the South Tyrol (and the Germans)
might have collided with the Italians’ mood, who were conscious of the
cost that had been paid for its attainment. All the good resolutions that
the Italian government maintained in Saint-Germain-en-laye were thus
stopped in the Parliament, where the nazionalists’ opposition prevailed.
The nationalist wave was well interpreted and taken advantage of by
Mussolini and its fascist party (Partito Nazionale Fascista). In 1922 Mus-
solini’s squads repeatedly invaded South Tyrol to defend its italianness
against the Pangermanism. The climax of the dispute was the March on
Bolzano organized on the 1st of October, when over 700 fascists invaded
the city and occupied the City Hall by force. Three weeks later Mus-
solini was appointed as Prime Minister: the process of Italianization of
the South Tyrol had its start.
The Italianization of the region pivoted around 3 pillars: (i) the de-
struction of Tyrolean collective memories; (ii) the primacy of the Italian
language and the ban of German; (iii) the immigration of Italians from
neighbouring regions.
(i) The destruction of Tyrolean collective memories. South Tyrolean
monuments that embodied strong symbolic power and promoted nar-
ratives linked to the region’s Germanness were either removed or de-
stroyed. Among others: the Walter von der Vodelweide statue in the
main square of Bolzano; the Laurin’s Fountain in Bolzano; the monu-
ments of Andreas Hofer and the Empress Elizabeth of Merano; and the
monument of the Grand Duke Henry of Gries near Bolzano. The mu-
seum of Bozen was undersized and made the headquarters of the Com-
mission for the Language and Culture (see Figure B1). New monuments
to celebrate the fascism power and South Tyrol’s italian character were
erected in Bolzano (the Victory Monument), in Brunick (to the Alpine
5 Resentments were particularly targeted towards Fiume and Pola, annexed to the newly
formed Yugoslavia despite being populated by an Italian majority. In the days that fol-
lowed the ratification of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Italian newspapers began
referring to it as the “mutilated victory.”
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soldiers) and in other South Tyrolean municipalities. The name itself,
South Tyrol, was interdicted and replaced by the Italian Alto Adige, while
the name of towns, villages, rivers, and mountains were substituted with
their Italian equivalent or created ex-novo when absent. Even the use of
German inscriptions on gravestones was prohibited, with already exis-
tent ones often required to be italianized (see Figure B2).
(ii) The primacy of the Italian language and the ban of German. The
second pillar of the Italianization program was the establishment of Ital-
ian as the only official language. This measure had several implications
for the labor market. First, German officials that did not know Italian
were dismissed, while Italians were appointed as clerks to all municipal
councils throughout the area.6 Examinations to become a public servant,
especially a teacher, were severe. As a result, in 1939 more than 95% of
all public posts were counted to be in the hands of Italians, despite the
group weighted the 25% of the total population. Second, it implied that
Italian was the only language to be used in the Courts.7 Further, Italian
gradually replaced German as language of instruction: by 1928-1929, it
was the sole language of instruction in all elementary schools. In mu-
nicipalities were German was by far the majority, supplementary classes
taught in the mother language could be arranged if requested by parents,
which came at the cost of being labelled as “anti-national.” According to
the official reports, in 1928-1929 there were 760 (30) classes with Italian
(German) being the instruction language. The 30 classes disappeared at
the beginning of the year 1929-1930.
(iii) The immigration of Italians from neighbouring regions. The
encouragement of massive movements (and subsequent settlement) of
workers and their families from other Italian regions to (in) South Ty-
rol was an additional lever which the Fascist regime heavily relied on
to successfully implement its Italianization programme. Movements to
6 A Royal Decree in 1925 stated that, to become a clerk to municipal councils, citizens
had to provide a certificate from an Italian secondary school or proof of service carried out
in the Italian administration for at least three years. The South Tyroler could have hardly
been able to fulfil these requirements.
7 The only tolerable exception was the case when both parties were Germans.
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the region were strongly incentivized by the development of industrial
zones and the subsequent creation of numerous job opportunities. While
up until the end of the 1920s, the Montecatini aluminium plant in Sinigo,
near Merano, was the only example of non-agricultural entity in the re-
gion, between 1935 and 1943 many leading companies set up branches
in the newly-created industrial zone around Bolzano, including Lancia,
Falck, Montecatini INA, Viberti, and SAIM. Such a shift towards the cre-
ation of a less-rural but more industrial community was accelerated by
the emanation and approval of several facilitation measures. For in-
stance, the Royal Decree of 23 September 1934 No. 1621, which set up
the industrial zone around Bolzano, provided (Art. 2) duty-free im-
port of construction materials and machines if the same could not be
produced in Italy; (Art.3) a ten-year exemption from income tax on the
newly erected concerns; (Art. 4) no raising of income tax on expanding
concerns; and (Art. 5) guarantee of state aid (Art. 6) up to 25 million lire
in yearly instalments of no more than 5 million lire. Alongside the in-
dustrialization process, the Fascist regime initiated a vast programme of
public houses construction to support the arrival of the newcomers, and
undertook a systematic harsh process of “soil conquest”, mainly backed
by the Istituto di Credito Fondiario delle Venezie and the Ente di Ri-
nascita Agraria per le Tre Venezie (ERA). Table A1 reports the number
of house units classified by ethnic group of the occupants and relative
to different time intervals: before 1919, 1919-1945, 1946-1960, and 1961-
1970. The number of houses having Italian-speakers as occupants in-
creased markedly after 1919, jumping from 4517 units in the pre-1919 pe-
riod to 7066 between 1919 and 1945, and rising further to 13313 units be-
tween 1961 and 1970. Conversely, the house units occupied by German-
speakers dropped by almost 3 quarters in the 1919-1945 period relative
to the pre-1919 one.
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2.2.2 The post-WWII interlude and the independence of
Austria
After the end of the WWII, Austria was split into four parts under control
of the Ally forces (France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United
States) and suspected of having been a tight collaborationist country of
Nazism. In Italy democracy was restored under a constitutional Repub-
lic and elections took place under a proportional rule that remained in
force until 1992 (the so-called prima Repubblica). The political system that
emerged was highly polarized. The two biggest parties were the Chris-
tian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), a center party with strong
ties with the Catholic Church, and the Communists (Partito Comunista
Italiano, PCI) that maintained throughout this period strong connections
with the Soviet Union hierarchies. On the extreme right, a post-fascist
political party (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI) was founded in 1946. De-
spite the term “fascism” was forbidden and could not appear anywhere,
the MSI party and fascism shared common values8.
The South Tyrol question was settled down under the supervision of
the WWII winners that led to the so-called Gruber-De Gasperi agreement
of the 19469. The agreement contained formulas that were to ensure more
autonomy to Germans; however, the Italian government took advantage
of the Austrian position to give a wide interpretation of the articles there
contained. The name of South Tyrol was restored (together with Alto
Adige) as well as the names of towns, rivers, mountains that were to be
referred in Italian as well as in German. Germans were allowed to attend
school classes in which the instruction language was German. Schools
continued to have no autonomy and their administration was controlled
by the Ministry of Education in Rome. Overall, full equality between the
two ethnic groups was far to be attained. Public posts were still an Ital-
ian prerogative—90% of the total public servants were Italians, although
Germans made up 65% of the total population. The right of using Ger-
8 On a more detailed description of the post-WWII political system see Fontana et al.
(2017).
9 The agreement, also known as the Treaty of Paris, was signed by Karl Gruber, Austrian
Foreign Minister, and Alcide De Gasperi, Italian Prime Minister.
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man in relations with officials and organs of the public administration,
introduced by the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement, had not been granted
in practice since bilingual officials and employees were lacking.
The increasing resentment among Germans due to the unsatisfac-
tory consequences of the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement started to be
taken into account when Austria became a de jure independent state,
with proper representatives in the United Nations and at any interna-
tional level. Along with diplomacy, the South Tyrolean question gained
visibility thanks to a massive terrorist wave that had its start in 1956, a
year later Austria regained independence. This long parenthesis of ter-
rorism produced 288 attacks and 19 dead men. According to the official
reports, terrorists were South Tyroleans (103), Austrian (40), and German
citizens (of the Federal Republic of Germany, 14)10. The reply of Rome
was harsh and Austria could not enter the European Economic Commu-
nity because of the Italian veto.
2.2.3 The “Package” reform and its implications for the
labor market
The bombing season (from mid-1950s onwards) put pressure on the Ital-
ian government and no doubt triggered a change in Italy’s South Tyrol
policy. With the election of a left-center wing government in 1963, hav-
ing a view more open toward the rights of minorities, this pressure was
conveyed to reach a solution to the South Tyrol question. International
negotiations resumed and Italy demanded that Austria revised its crim-
inal code seriously to push up new efforts to combat terror. In exchange
Italy proposed an “all-inclusive offer” that, from August 1966, became
famous as the “Package”. The dispute between Austria and Italy was of-
ficially concluded on the 30th of November 1969, when the Italian Prime
Minister Aldo Moro and the Austrian Foreign Minister Kurt Waldheim
signed the agreement in Copenhagen 11, the word “packages” all of a
10 See the Elenco delle sentenze per fatti di terrorismo dal 1956 al 1988, Procura della Repub-
blica presso il Tribunale di Bolzano.
11 In November 22 the reform was approved by the SVP (with 52.8% of vote in favor of
it), while the 4th of December the Italian Chamber approved it by 282 votes to 26 (MSI and
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sudden became a word to which both Italians and Germans got very fa-
miliar with.
The Package was indeed likely to overrule the status-quo transferring
power from the Italian minority to the German majority and therefore
determining a clear juncture in the South Tyrol history.
While the autonomous Region Trentino-South Tyrol remained, its pri-
mary legislative power was transferred to the Autonomous Provinces
of Trento and Bolzano with respect to numerous subjects, ranging from
agriculture and forestry, hunting and fishing, public welfare and char-
ity to communication and transport of provincial interest, employment
exchanges, expropriations, and others. Th two Provinces also obtained
secondary legislative power in areas like vocational training, public se-
curity, hygiene and healthcare, public water, and further ones. Such re-
organization and authority redistribution were meant to convey the fact
that, in the Province of Bolzano (and only there), the power had to move
from the Italian minority towards the German majority. The latter one,
in fact, was to be overrepresented in the Council of the Province. Yet, the
reform endowed the Provinces with an unprecedented degree of fiscal
autonomy. While under the 1948 Autonomy Statute, South Tyrol relied
almost entirely on funding from the State or the Region, from 1969 on-
wards nine tenth of the tax revenues collected had been set to remain in
the Province.
Several measures concerning linguistic minorities were also agreed
on. German was recognized as a local official language, with Italian re-
taining its predominance in case of, for example, a bilingual text or doc-
uments of a legislative character. Three autonomous school boards were
formed, each competent for administrating the schools of its own lin-
guistic group, with special arrangement established for Ladin schools.
Knowledge of both Italian and German was required to all citizens who
were employed in the public administration sector; a language examina-
tion had also to be sit as a pre-requisite for recruitment, promotion or to
obtain transfers to other organizations.
What caught more attention among Italian was, however, the new
Monarchists).
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equality principle underlying the awarding of the public posts, which
were now set to be reserved to citizens of all language groups and pro-
portionally to their numerosity. Specifically, Point 94 of the reform refers
to “application of ethnic proportions in the individual administrations
effectively represented in the Province of Bolzano, and, within the ad-
ministrations, in the individual permanent career posts, on the basis of
the existing proportions between the Italian and German linguistic groups
in the Province (approximately one-third and two-thirds)” (Alcock (1970)).
The principle of proportionality was to entail a complex reshuffle of pub-
lic posts to the detriment of the Italian minority group who had histor-
ically benefited from a privileged position within that activity sector of
the labour market. In the remainder of the paper we specifically test
whether the announcement of the reshuffle of public posts among lin-
guistic groups triggers anti-German sentiments among the Italian group.
2.3 Data description
To investigate whether middlemen minorities develop political extremist
preferences when threatened in their economic privileges by a majority
group, we collect a wealth of data from several different sources. Table
1 reports summary statistics of all variables employed in the analysis.
Details of both data and relative sources are provided below.
Political preferences: We rely upon the Historical Election Archive,
an online database regularly updated and published by the Italian Min-
istry of Interior, to gather information about the general Elections to the
Lower Chamber of Deputies held in 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968 and 1972. For
each of these five rounds of voting and for every single municipality
within the Trento-Bolzano electoral constituency, we collect data on (1)
the number of votes each party or electoral block secured; (2) the num-
ber of blank and invalid paper ballots; and (3) the number of eligible and
registered voters. We then define our outcome variables as the ratio be-
tween total votes of the Italian-speaking population for the Movimento
Sociale Italiano (MSI) and number of registered voters. We also construct
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A — observations: commune × election year
MSI vote share 7.425 12.83 0 95.52 1527
I(South Tyrol) 0.362 0.481 0 1 1527
Population 2540.3 7355.7 83 105699 1527
EthnicConcentration Index 0.937 0.124 0.481 1 1527
Share of Ladins 2.163 13.41 0 99.29 1527
Illiterate among Italians 8.828 38.82 0 815 1527
Univ. degrees among Italians 19.96 147.0 0 2862 1527
high− school degrees among Italians 86.12 539.9 0 9478 1527
Share of blank ballot papers 0.0485 0.0268 0 0.238 1527
Share of abstained 0.0624 0.0397 0 0.380 1527
Workforce inPublicAdministration 84.40 421.4 0 5479 1512
Workforce inConstruction 103.7 239.2 1 3339 1512
Workforce inServices 124.3 526.3 1 8630 1512
Workforce in Trade 160.8 621.5 1 9429 1512
Workforce in Transport 42.79 192.0 0 2959 1512
Workforce inAgriculture 263.2 281.1 2 3275 1512
Workforce in Industry 222.9 785.2 1 11144 1514
Panel B — observations: commune (in South Tyrol)
%Italians 13.20 18.73 0 81.99 115
migrations 1930s 1441.2 4676.8 0 38622 115
publ. housing 1930s 0.154 0.201 0 0.841 114
railway routes 0.165 0.373 0 1 115
Share publ. servants Italians 1960 0.422 0.286 0 1 112
Share construction Italians 1960 0.0905 0.0953 0 0.745 112
Share services Italians 1960 0.0854 0.0998 0 0.643 112
Share trade Italians 1960 0.0947 0.0892 0 0.667 112
Share transport Italians 1960 0.0965 0.0938 0 0.475 112
Share agriculture Italians 1960 0.0749 0.134 0 0.658 112
Share industry Italians 1960 0.136 0.141 0 1 112
Share Italians publ. servants 1960 0.492 0.246 0 0.915 115
Eth. concentr. publ. servants 1960 0.614 0.143 0.369 1 115
Occupations concentr. Italians 1960 0.385 0.235 0.157 1 112
Terroristic attacks 1.878 4.371 0 39 115
Terroristic attacks 1961− 66 1.765 4.113 0 36 115
Terroristic attacks 1966 0.278 0.923 0 7 115
(Population < 20k) 0.983 0.131 0 1 115
H/l hierarchy Germans 0.201 0.273 -0.250 2.250 115
H/l hierarchy Germans/Italians 1.275 17.17 -10.47 180.8 115
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two additional variables that enter the regressions as controls: the share
of blank voters and the share of abstained voters.
Linguistic groups: Data on the percentage composition of the three
official language groups (Italian, German, and Ladin) by municipality in
the province of Bolzano come from the Population Censuses that were
carried out -once in ten years- from 1961 to 1981. As for the municipal-
ities in the province of Trento, which make up our control group, we
exclude from the final dataset those who correspond, as indicated in the
Legislative Decree No. 592 of 16 December 1993 and the Provincial Law
No. 4 of 30 August 1999, to the original settlement areas of the three
historical linguistic minorities: Ladin, Mòcheno and Cimbrian. We thus
drop the Ladin municipalities of the Val di Fassa (Campitello di Fassa,
Canazei, Mazzin, Moena, Pozza di Fassa, Soraga e Vigo di Fassa) as
well as the three German-speaking municipalities of the Val dei Mòcheni
(Fierozzo, Frassilongo and Pal del Fersina), and the Cimbrian municipal-
ity of Luserna.
The language analysed up to 1961 was the commonly spoken one,
whereas in 1971 and 1981 it was a declaration -made by each member of
the resident population- of which language group they belonged to. No
information about the language composition of the municipalities was
provided in the 1951 Census. We impute missing data for the years 1953,
1958, 1963, 1968 and 1972 using linear interpolation.
Italianization: To address potential endogeneity issues and establish
an unbiased causal link between changes in the electoral support of Ital-
ians for the MSI party and changes in the share of population belong-
ing to the Italian linguistic group, we assemble three instruments. The
first one aims to capture the observed phenomenon of massive immi-
gration from other Italian regions that South Tyrol experienced in the
1930s. Throughout those years, movements of Italian-speaking people
were greatly promoted and strongly incentivized by the Fascist regime
since regarded as a channel through which the programme of Italianiza-
tion of South Tyrol and the South Tyrolese had to be carried out. Figure 4
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Figure 4: Number of registrations at the Registry Office (Anagrafe) for
change of residence from another Italian municipality
of residence from another Italian municipality has been increasing from
1932 onwards.
We make use of this historical evidence to construct an instrument
that attempts to isolate exogenous variation in the Italian resident pop-
ulation regressor. We collect municipal-level data for the period 1932-
1939 on the number of: (1) persons registered for change of residence
from another Italian municipality (registrations from other municipal-
ity); (2) persons registered for change of residence from abroad (regis-
trations from abroad); (3) persons cancelled for change of residence to
another Italian municipality (cancellations to other municipality); and
(4) persons cancelled for change of residence to abroad (cancellations to
abroad). Data come from the Provincial Statistics Institute (ASTAT) and
cover the period from 1932 to 1939. Using the resulting dataset, we con-
struct the Italianization index, which is defined, for each municipality in
the province of Bolzano, as the sum of the annual differences between
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registrations from other municipality and registrations from abroad.
Housing units and the Brenner railway: The immigration process
of Italian workers and their families to South Tyrol in the 1930s was
backed by the implementation of a rigorous programme of public hous-
ing construction (see Figure B3 in the Appendix) and was promoted by
the creation of an industrial zone around Bolzano. We exploit this addi-
tional historical evidence to construct a second instrument defined as the
share of housing units occupied between 1919 and 1945 by families who
belonged to the Italian linguistic group. Data on the number of occu-
pied housing units that were built between 1919 and 1945 -by language
group- are taken from the 1981 Census of Population and Housing. The
last instrument comes from observing the route covered by the Salorno-
Brenner section of the Brenner railway, a line that was designed under
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and constructed at the end of the nine-
teenth century to connect regions in the North of Italy to Austria. It is
defined as a dummy variable that takes on value 1 for the municipalities
served by train stations along the route and 0 for those who are not.
Resident population, education and activity sectors: To construct
the variables placed on the right-hand side of the estimated regressions,
we draw data from a wide array of Population Census volumes cov-
ering the period between 1951 and 1981. For all municipalities in the
province of Bolzano as well as for those in the province of Trento, we col-
lect data on: (1) the total number of resident population; (2) the resident
population by educational level and language group (University degree,
upper secondary certificate, lower secondary certificate, primary school
certificate, literate but without any qualification, and illiterate); and (3)
the resident population by activity sector and language group (agricul-
ture, building, industry, public administration, services, trade, and trans-
port and communications). Table A2 reports total and shares of popula-
tion and linguistic groups by activity sectors. Most inhabitants of the
South Tyrol was employed in agriculture, 90% of which belonged to the
German-speaking group, with a smaller percentage working in industry
and trade. As for the public administrative sector, it was a prerogative
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of the Italian-speaking population: 11148 out of 14789 public posts were
covered by Italians.
Terrorist attacks: To capture the incandescent atmosphere South Ty-
rol and the South Tyrolese experienced between the end of the 1950s and
the mid-1970s, we collect from the Historical Archive of the Italian Senate
several statistical volumes, all part of the Atti Terrorismo e stragi prodotti
dalla Commissione per il filone Alto Adige durante la X legislatura. We
exploit the detailed information contained in these volumes on the mu-
nicipalities in the province of Bolzano where (and the dates when) terror-
ist attacks occurred to create variables on (1) the total number of terror-
ist attacks; (2) the dead among civilians; (3) the dead among militaries;
(4) the dead among authors of terrorist attacks; (5) the wounded among
civilians; and (6) the wounded among militaries. We also come up with
a dummy variable taking on value 1 or 0 depending on whether the au-
thor of the attack had been identified or not, respectively. Figure B4 in
the Appendix provides a picture of the number of attacks executed be-
tween 1956 and 1972. Dynamitard attacks on high tension and rail lines,
electricity pylons, public buildings and fascist monuments started after
Austria became independent on 15 May 1955, reached a pick in 1961 in
response to the failure of the negotiations between Italian and Austrian
Governments on the application of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement,
and lowered after the announcement of the “Package” reform in 1966,
although still being carried out till the mid-1970s.
2.4 Empirical strategy and results
2.4.1 Baseline estimation
We estimate the effect on political preferences of the fear of losing histor-
ically established economic rents by employing a standard difference-in-
differences technique. Specifically, we compare the relative change in the
vote share of the Italians to the MSI in the post-announcement period of
the “Package” relative to the pre-announcement period between munici-
palities that were likely to be affected (i.e., those in South Tyrol) and those
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that were unlikely to be affected by it. As Trentino was 100% populated
by Italians the reform’, which was to introduce a large amount of auton-
omy in this Province as well, were unlikely to redistribute established
economic rents to members of other ethnic groups. The municipalities of
Trentino therefore make an appropriate control group to assess the rela-
tive change in the vote share of the Italians to the MSI in those in South
Tyrol.
As we explained in Section 2.2.3, the “Package” reform was signed
in 1969 and implemented progressively starting from 1974. The inter-
lude between 1966 and 1974 was therefore a period of great uncertainty
for the entire population. However, news began to circulate with its an-
nouncement in 1966 that prompted fear among the Italian population.
We thus take the 1966 as the cut-off year and, in sub-section 2.4.2, we
provide a flexible estimation that shows how the definition of this cut-off
is consistent with the data.
Our baseline difference-in-differences regression is defined as follows:
yit = β(treati × post1966t) +Xitγ′ + δi + µt + εit, (2.1)
where i indexes municipalities and t indexes election years, which are
1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, and 1972. The unit of observation is municipality
times election year. The variable post1966t is a dummy which takes on
value 1 for the elections after the 1966 and 0 before. The variable treati
is a dummy which takes on value 1 for the municipalities of South Tyrol
and 0 for those in the Province of Trent.12 The outcome of interest, yit, is
the number of votes that in the election t Italians cast in each municipality
i. The equation also includes municipality and election year fixed effects,
δi and µt, as well as time-variant control at municipal level, Xit. Finally,
εit is the idiosyncratic error that we cluster at municipality level.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 display the estimation results of equa-
tion 2.1. As expected, the estimated difference-in-differences coefficient
is positive and statistically significantly different from zero at whatever
level of significance we care to use, and has a value of 4.645 (Column 1).
Following the announcement of the “Package” reform the support for
12 We exclude *** municipalities in the Province of Trent where Ladins are the majority.
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the MSI party increased in the South Tyrolean municipalities relative to
those in Trentino. The magnitude drops slightly to 4.145 but remains still
statistically significant in column (2), where we include a set of controls:
the total resident population, the share of Ladins, the group language
concentration index, the number of Italians who are illiterate, the num-
ber of Italians who hold a high-school diploma and that of Italians who
hold a university degree, the number of abstained voters and the number
of blank ballot papers.
Table 2: MSI vote share before and after the announcement of the packages
— Baseline and flexible estimates
Dependent variable is: MSI vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(South Tyrol)× post1966 4.645∗∗∗ 4.145∗∗∗
(1.355) (1.545)
I(South Tyrol)× 1958 1.458 1.863
(1.831) (1.894)
I(South Tyrol)× 1963 -1.234 -1.619
(1.944) (2.231)
I(South Tyrol)× 1968 3.374 2.317
(2.135) (2.320)
I(South Tyrol)× 1972 6.057∗∗∗ 6.365∗∗
(2.178) (2.727)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comune FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1628 1527 1628 1527
R2 0.040 0.042 0.046 0.053
Note: Dependent variable is the vote share of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). The unit of
observation is comune × election year. Columns 2 and 4 include the number of inhabitants, the
group language concentration index, the share of Ladins, the number of Italians that are illiterate,
the number of Italians that hold a high-school diploma as well as those that hold a University
degree. They also control for the number of abstained voters and the number of blank ballot
papers. In columns 3 and 4 estimates are relative to the baseline category, year 1953. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipal level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.4.2 Flexible estimation
To test for the existence of a pre-trend in the support for the MSI be-
fore the announcement of the “Package” reform and to understand the
timing of the shift in the MSI vote share after the announcement, we re-





βt(treati × µt) +Xitγ′ + δi + µt + εit. (2.2)
where the coefficients βts are now allowed to vary over the 5-year time
periods and is measured relative to the 1953 baseline category. We present
the results of this regression in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 and illus-
trate them graphically in Figure 5.
Relative to 1953, the support for the MSI in South Tyrol does not ap-
pear higher in the pre-announcement years 1958 and 1962 and no spe-
cific trend arises. The 1958 and 1962 coefficients are not statistically sig-
nificant, have mixed signs and are not large in magnitude. The results
also highlight that the upward shift in the support for the MSI did not
take time to develop but took place soon after the reform announcement.
No differences in magnitude, sign and significance emerge when control
variables are accounted for (Column 4).
2.5 Concentration of economic rents
The way and extent to which the Italian-speaking population spatially
distributed across South Tyrolean municipalities (see Figure 1) might
have impacted their political preferences. We scrutinize this argument
through estimation of the following specification:
yit = β(treati × post1966t) + θ(treati × post1966t × share itait)+
+Xitγ
′ + δi + µt + εit,
(2.3)
where share itait denotes the share of Italians in municipality i at time t.
Column (1) in Table 3 reports the estimate of the coefficient on the triple
interaction term. The coefficient comes with a negative sign (-0.133) and
is statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance. Con-
sistent with a story of economic rents concentration, our model predicts,
following the announcement of the “Package,” an increase in the MSI
vote share in response to a reduction in the share of Italians. In munic-






1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
election year
Figure 5: Coefficient estimates and confidential intervals (95%) from regres-
sion results displayed in Table 2, column 4.
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of losing them was greater. This feeling might have, in turn, affected the
voting behaviour of the minority group electorate after the announce-
ment of a reform that aimed at transferring further rights and power to
the majority. The interaction coefficient increases only slightly when con-
trols enter the right-hand side of Equation (2.3).
2.5.1 Instrumental variable approach: the Italianization
of the South Tyrol
The settlement of the Italian-speaking population in South Tyrol might
have, however, been driven by the political structure of the municipal-
ities. Bracco et al. (2017), for instance, has shown that the appointment
of a right-wing party major in municipalities of Northern Italy reduces
the likelihood of immigrants to move on in them. Their findings suggest
that our estimates documented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 could be
biased and would not allow a causal interpretation of the results. On top
of that, they are also likely to capture a lower bound of the total effect of
the “Package” on anti-German attitudes of Italians. It could indeed be
that Italians less sensitive to the ethnic conflict might have consciously
chosen to move to the smallest Tyrolean villages to cover public posts
and therefore their reaction to the “Package” could be arguably lower.
To isolate exogenous variation in the settlement choice of Italians, we
estimate by two stage least squares (2SLS) three just-identified separate
models,13 one for each employed instrument. First-stage results are re-
ported in Columns (3), (5) and (7) of Table 3. All the instruments appear
to satisfy the relevance condition since their correlation with the endoge-
nous regressor, once the other explanatory variables are netted out, is
statistically different from zero. Second-stage results are displayed in
Columns(4), (6) and (8) of the same Table and corroborate the presence
of a negative sign governing the relationship between share of Italians
settled in South Tyrolean municipalities and political support for the
MSI party. For instance, when instrumenting for the Italian share of the
13 A unique over-identified model is also estimated as robustness check. Results, re-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































population with migration inflows from neighbouring Italian regions in
the 1930s, we estimate that a municipality with one standard deviation
above the mean in the share of Italians experienced a 0.31 standard de-
viations drop in the MSI vote share. Coefficient estimates remain almost
unchanged when the number of housing units built in the 1919-1945 pe-
riod or an indicator of the municipalities served by stations along the
Brenner railway route are used as instruments.
2.6 Additional evidence from the labor market
The declaration of Italian as the only language in the public offices by a
Prefectural Decree of 28 October 1923 and subsequent laws had caused
dismissal of numerous South Tyrolese German-speaking officials from
their posts and strongly incentivized immigration of Italian officials from
other regions. By 1939 more than 95% of all public posts were in the
hands of Italians, although German speaker accounted for 75% of the
population. The announcement of the “Package” in 1966 reshuffled the
status-quo and brought the fractionalized structure of the labour market
back to question: public posts were no longer a prerogative of the Italian-
speaking population, but reserved to members of all language groups in
proportion to their numerosity. The reform might have instilled fear to
lose economic privileges in Italians, thereby influencing their political
preferences. To investigate this channel, we estimate the following equa-
tion:
yit = β(treati × post1966t) + θ(treati × post1966t×
×share pubamm itait) +Xitγ′ + δi + µt + εit,
(2.4)
where share pubamm itait denotes the share of public servants among
Italians. Results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) differ from (2) only
for the absence of control variables. After the “Package” reform was an-
nounced, we find that a standard deviation rise in the share of public ser-
vants among Italians increases the vote share of the MSI party by 3.72%.
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To exclude channels, other than the public administration one, from
being at play, we investigate different model specifications. First, we add
triple interaction terms to control for the share of employees among Ital-
ians in alternative occupations (construction, services, trade, transport,
agriculture, or industry). Results are displayed in Columns 3 to 8 of Table
4. The coefficient on the triple interaction that includes the share of public
servants among Italians remains always statistically significantly differ-
ent from zero. For instance, when accounting for the share of employees
in agriculture among Italians, we estimate that, after the announcement
of the “Package” reform, a one standard deviation growth in the share
of public servants among Italians boosts the support for the MSI party
in South Tyrolean municipalities relative to those in Trentino by roughly
3.3 %. In Column (9), we combine all triple interaction terms and leave
out the one that captures the share of employees in the industry sector
among Italians, which is used as baseline category. Again, the coefficient
estimates of the interactions that are not related to the public adminis-
tration sector are all statistically indistinguishable from zero. We com-
plement this initial robustness exercise by means of further measures of
ethnolinguistic concentration in the labour market: the share of Italians
among public servants; the ethnic concentration index in the public ad-
ministration; and the job concentration index in the Italian group. Each
of these is interacted with a dummy that captures the observations in the
treatment group and a post-treatment dummy. Results, shown in Table
5, confirm that, following the reform announcement in 1966, municipal-
ities where Italians specialized the most as public servants were more
supportive of the MSI party. The coefficient on the share of employees
in the public administration among Italians remains highly statistically
significant and exhibit an even increasing size when concentration mea-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.7 Potential alternative mechanisms
The evidence of an increase in the MSI voting share after the 1966 an-
nouncement of the “Package” reform in South Tyrolean relative to Trentino
municipalities might potentially be founded on alternative grounds and
interpreted from different angles. The fear of being deprived of historically-
established economic rents that pervaded Italians from 1966 onwards
might have not been the only mechanism at work. In this section, we
test whether being exposed to a more intense terrorist wave has made
anti-German sentiments more salient. We also test the effect of relative
income and additional mechanisms based on population.
2.7.1 Terrorist attacks
The dynamitard activities carried out from mid-1950s onwards to draw
attention of the international press on the South Tyrol question might
provide a first possible explanation to the move of Italians voting pref-
erences towards an extremist political party. After Austria became in-
dependent on 15 May 1955, a renewed harsh interest in examining the
complaints and fulfil the wishes of the South Tyrolese emerged (Alcock
(1970)). Complaints were mainly related to the Italian Governments non-
observance of some clauses of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement, partic-
ularly: (i) the exercise of autonomous legislative and executive regional
power granted to the German-speaking inhabitants of the Province of
Bolzano; and (ii) the safeguarding of the ethnical character and the cul-
tural and economic development of the German-speaking group.14
The resulting diplomatic battle that started with the Italian Aide-Mém-
oire of July 1956 and continued with the Austrian Memorandum of Oc-
14 The principle of assuring ethnic proportions in public offices had been disregarded in
toto. As Alcock (1970) reports, 93.5% of the posts in the State Administration of the Bolzano
Departmental Directorate of the State Railways was occupied by Italians; the percentage
was equal to 78.9% in the Postal Administration, 97.7% in the Labour Exchange, Labour
Control Board, and the Social Security Administration, 99.2% in the Prefecture of Police,
87.1% in the Judiciary, 98.6% in the Department of Public Finance. Moreover, 16 out of
28 posts in the Bolzano Chamber of Commerce were held by Italians, 9 out of 12 in the
Regional Credit Bureau, 13 out of 17 in the Provincial Commission of the Labour Exchange,
and 90 out of 97 in the Provincial Health Insurance Administration.
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tober 1956, the Italian reply of February 1957, the 1960 debate over South
Tyrol question at the United Nations, and subsequent nine years of Austro-
Italian consultations, created a rather tense atmosphere and served to
arouse public opinion. From the autumn of 1956 onwards, numerous dy-
namitard attacks on high tension and rail lines, electricity pylons, pub-
lic buildings and fascist monuments were executed in the province of
Bolzano, particularly in the municipalities of Bolzano, Campo Tures, Ap-
piano sulla Strade del Vino, Termeno sulla Strada del Vino, Brunico and
Merano (see Figure B5 in the Appendix), causing dead and wounded
among militaries and civilians. Our results could be picking up the ef-
fects of these attacks. We geolocalize each terrorist attack and match such
information with municipal spatial boundary to assign attacks to com-
munes as in Figure B5. As we explained in Section 2.3 we construct three
variables: (i) the total number of attacks that occurred in each munici-
pality of the Province of Bolzano between 1956 and 1972, (ii) the number
of attacks over the 1961-1966 period, and (iii) the number of attacks in
1966. We therefore reformulate our model specification by multiplying
the dummy that identifies observations in the treatment group and the
post-treatment dummy with the each of the above three variables.
Results are reported in Table 6. Regardless of the period which ter-
rorist attacks refer to and of whether additional control variables are
accounted for or not, all the estimated coefficients reveal a substantial
increase in the voting share of the MSI party after the announcement
of the “Package” reform. Results reported in Columns (3), (6), and (9)
also reveal that the triple interaction term between the dummy for the
treated group, the post-treatment temporal dummy, and the share of
public servants among Italians remains statistically significantly differ-
ent from zero and preserves its positive sign and size even when terrorist
attacks are accounted for.
2.7.2 Relative income
Changes in the relative income of ethnic groups due to income shocks































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Muslim violence in post-Independence India, Mitra and Ray (2014) find
that an increase in per capita Muslim expenditures leads to a significant
increase in short to medium run conflicts. Ethnic and religious violence
might thus be brought about by changes in relative incomes of two com-
peting ethnic groups.
Since data on income of Italian- and German-speaking groups are not
available, we gather information from the 1961 and 1971 Censuses on the
resident population by occupational categories along vertical hierarchy
and assemble two proxy variables: the difference between 1971 and 1961
in the ratio of German managers and businesspeople to German employ-
ees; and the difference between the same two years in the ratio of Ger-
man managers and businesspeople to German employees divided by the
ratio of Italian managers and businesspeople to Italian employees. Both
variables are higher when the economic situations of Germans increased
during the ten-year period across the announcement of the packages.
The second measure also tells us how much the economic situations of
Germans increased relative to that of Italians.
Results obtained by employing these two variables are displayed in
Table 7. Our main argument that, pushed by the fear of losing their
established economic privileges, Italians’ political preferences after the
1966 reform announcement developed towards a more extremist direc-
tion in municipalities where they had specialized in the public adminis-
tration sector, is strongly corroborated by the results. The coefficients on
the triple interactions that incorporate the income proxies are both sta-
tistically not significant, whereas the coefficients on the interactions that
capture the effect of the share of public servants among Italians are both
statistically different from zero at the 5% level of significance and come
with the expected signs.
2.8 Conclusions
In this paper we exploit a unique experiment of history that occurred
in the 1960s in South Tyrol to investigate how and to what extent fric-
tions in the labor market prompt salience in the ethnic conflict and in-
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duce a move in ethnic minorities voting preferences towards more ex-
tremist political platforms. During the fascist epoch, South Tyrol expe-
rienced a complex process of Italianization that produced persistent dis-
tortions in the public administration sector of the labor market in favor
of the Italian-speaking minority group. This well-rooted ethnic division
of labour was, however, brought back to question by the 1966 announce-
ment of the Package reform that aimed, among others, at awarding pub-
lic posts to citizens of all language groups and proportionally to their
numerosity.
Drawing upon a wealth of data on Italians voting preferences, com-
position of the population by linguistic group, and detailed informa-
tion on occupations in the labour market, we find that, following the
reform announcement, the vote share of the post-fascist party increased
markedly in South Tyrolean municipalities relative to those in the province
of Trento. The increase was higher in those municipalities where Italians
had specialised the most as public servants: a municipality with a one
standard deviation above the mean in the share of public servants among
Italians is estimated to experience a 3.72% increase in the MSI vote share.
These results bring evidence of an extremist move in the political prefer-
ences of the Italian minority group induced by the fear of being deprived
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Immigrants are making up a continuously growing proportion of the Eu-
ropean population. In 2014, circa 1.9 million people moved to the EU-28
from non-member State countries, while another 1.8 million migrated to
and from another EU Member State. By January 2015, 19.8 million cit-
izens of non-member countries and 34.3 million people born outside of
the EU were living in the EU-28 (Eurostat 2016).
Meanwhile, radical right-wing populist parties - with anti-immigration
actions at the core of their political agendas - have increased and broad-
ened electoral support across Europe. For instance, in the 2014 general
election, the Sverigedemokraterna became Sweden’s third biggest party, se-
curing almost 13 percent of the vote; the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark
won 21.1 percent of the vote in 2015, almost doubling its support since
the previous 2011 general election and, in 2015, the Schweizerische Volkspar-
tei obtained a record 29.4 percent of the vote in Switzerland. As of De-
cember 2016, the Alternative for Germany (AFD) party has gained repre-
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sentation in ten of the 16 German Federal state parliaments and won
7.1 percent of the votes in the European Parliament elections in 2014.
In the same election, The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) be-
came the strongest British party winning 26.6 percent of votes. More
recently, in the presidential election in Austria, the candidate of the Free-
dom Party Austria (FP), Norbert Hofer, won 48 percent of votes, or in
October 2017, the same party winning 51 seats (out of 183) in the Aus-
trian parliament. As a consequence of this political shift across Europe,
partly reinforced by the portrayal of the so-called European refugee cri-
sis, some European governments have started tightening some of their
immigration policies, even in traditionally more open and liberal coun-
tries such as Sweden where, on 21 June 2016, the Swedish Parliament
adopted legislative changes that introduce a temporary three-year (13-
month) residence permit for those granted refugee (subsidiary protec-
tion) status and limit remarkably the possibilities of asylum seekers to
be reunited with their families. This political backlash seems - at least
partly - to be driven by growing perceptions and beliefs that continuing
immigrant flows establish a threat to the economic, cultural, and social
status quo and future prospects. The Spring 2016 Eurobarometer reports
that almost half of Europeans (48 percent) mention immigration as the
issue of greatest concern, well ahead of terrorism and the economy. Al-
though there is no unified theory for public attitudes and opinion on im-
migration (Chandler (2001); Price (1995)), the literature presents a num-
ber of factors potentially driving anti-immigrant sentiments (Rustenbach
(2010)). Economic theories for instance, explain opposition to incom-
ing migrants to be shaped by fears about labour market competition
(Mayda (2006); Scheve (2001)) and a growing fiscal burden on public
services (Boeri (2005); Facchini (2009); Hanson (2007)) Natives are more
likely to oppose immigrants with similar skills and support inflows of
those with skill endowments that complement their own (Mayda (2006);
Scheve (2001)). Moreover, when governments adjust tax rates to balance
their budgets, or alternatively, adjust per capita welfare benefits while
trying to keep tax rates constant, high-income earners are economically
more negatively (positively) affected by inflows of unskilled immigrants
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than low-income earners and, therefore, are expected to be more opposed
to (in favour of) low-skilled immigrant inflows (Facchini (2009)). Non-
economic explanations emphasize socio-cultural factors, mainly reflect-
ing nativist mind-sets and a high degree of national identification with
a strong desire for ethnically homogeneous societies. Hostility to new-
comers has been associated with, for instance, an isolationist mentality,
pessimistic evaluations of the current and future state of the economy,
and feelings of alienation from mainstream social and political institu-
tions (Espenshade (1996)); racial or cultural prejudice (Dustmann (2007);
Gang (2002)); beliefs about the size of the immigrant population, cultural
and national identities, and a general disposition to trust in other people
(Sides (2007)); threats to in-group resources and threats to the shared cus-
toms and traditions of the society (McLaren (2007)); perceived cultural
threats especially with regard to the English language (Chandler (2001));
or stereotypical beliefs about the work ethic and intelligence of other
groups (Burns (2000)). This study builds on these rather amorphous
explanations and contributes a new conceptual angle and empirical per-
spective on the formation and dissemination of anti-immigrant attitudes.
Like other studies before, we hereby identify significant heterogeneity
in immigration attitudes across space and time. Immigration attitudes
vary significantly across European regions (Markaki (2013); Rustenbach
(2010); Schlueter (2008)), which still exist even after controlling for so-
cioeconomic differences (Raijman (2003)). These spatial patterns, how-
ever, seem to change over time, and the present study argues that anti-
immigration sentiments are part of a spatial-dynamic diffusion and clus-
tering process by which otherwise similar people living in different Eu-
ropean regions tend to vary greatly in their attitudes. Our empirical in-
vestigation builds on the propositions of dynamic social impact theory
(Latané (1981, 1996)), and finds robust evidence for a prevalent spatial
dependence of anti-immigration attitudes across 30 European countries
and respective sub-national regions. This explains the existence of mul-
tiple regional clusters with relatively similar anti-immigrant attitudes
within and differences across those clusters even when controlling for
other economic and non-economic factors. We argue that when people
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form their opinions about immigration and immigrants they are strongly
influenced by the (anti-)immigrant attitudes of people living in the same
or nearby location. This implies - in terms of Tobler’s first law of geog-
raphy (see e.g. Anselin (1988)) - that (average) immigrant attitudes of
people living in a European region are more influenced by attitudes in
nearby regions than those in more distant ones - even if nearby regions
are on different sides of country borders.
3.2 Spatial dependence in anti-immigrant atti-
tudes
This study adds, in our view, an important and possibly decisive factor
to better understand the evolution and diffusion of anti-immigrant at-
titudes across time and space, namely the social impact of (groups of)
people on the way other (groups of) people may feel and think about
an issue such as immigration. Social and spatial proximity (or, distance)
between subjects is hereby assumed to be an important factor in explain-
ing similarity (or, dissimilarity) in people’s attitudes. Socio-spatial dis-
tance between subjects is often ignored in the conceptualisation of social
processes of interaction and influence. A notable exception is Latané’s
theory of dynamic social impact (Latané (1981, 1996)) which emphasizes
the importance of distance (’immediacy’) as a major determinant of so-
cial influence 1. The impact of other people on a target person or group
of persons is proposed to be a function of three factors: the number of
others who make up the source, their immediacy or proximity, and the
strength or salience of their ’information’. Further, it is assumed that, al-
though people influence each other in a variety of ways through psycho-
logical processes of social interaction, all operate through socio-spatial
dimensions of proximity and similarity (Latané (1996)).
These propositions applied to the process of anti-immigrant senti-
ments spreading across space and time imply that anti-immigrant at-
1Social influence can hereby be understood as a change in people’s thoughts, feelings,
attitudes, and ultimately, behaviours resulting from interaction with other individuals or
groups.
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titudes A′ of a ’target’ population are influenced in a (multiplicative)
function as by the strength of the ’source’ population’s anti-immigrant
sentiment A, the (inverse) spatial distance D between source and target
populations and the size of the influencing source population, P :
A′ = f(A,D,P ) (3.1)
Impediments to the operation of any of the three factors may, how-
ever, attenuate social impact (Latané (1996)). Individuals are influenced
by the majority, i.e. when a large portion of an individual’s or a group’s
reference population holds a particular attitude, it is likely that this indi-
vidual or group of individuals will adopt it as well. This non-deterministic
process is able to describe and predict the diffusion of all sorts of beliefs
and attitudes through social systems (Latané (1996)). It is based on the
assumption that social structure is the result of individuals influencing
each other in a dynamic and iterative way, and people are assumed to be
more influenced by other people living nearby rather than those farther
away. This continuous process of mutual influence eventually leads to
local clusters and regional patterns of otherwise ’randomly’ distributed
attitudes and beliefs.
As a result of the non-random spatial distribution of anti-immigrant
attitudes we may identify spatial dependence 2 of attitudes which corre-
sponds to the importance of spatial proximity in shaping the degree of
social influence experienced by a target population. Spatial dependence
of anti-immigrant attitudes finds support in a fundamental tendency of
people’s attitudes on immigration to become spatially clustered.
Our empirical strategy is to identify spatial dependence in anti- im-
2Spatial dependence and its patterns have been studied across a variety of areas (see in
Plümper (2010) for an overview) such as military spending and armed conflict (Salehyan
(2006); Shin (1999)), asylum migration (Barthel (2015)), terrorism (Bove (2016); Neumayer
(2016)), democratization (Gleditsch (2006)), diffusion of environmental technologies and
standards (Perkins (2008, 2009)), monetary policies (Plümper (2008); Simmons (2004)), tax
and fiscal policies (Basinger (2004); Hays (2003, 2009); Plümper (2009); Swank (2006)), trade
and investment policies (Elkins (2006); Mansfield (2003)), social policies (Bailey (2004);
Brooks (2007); Franzese Jr (2006); Jahn (2006); Tam Cho (2003)). Most of these studies find
supportive evidence for the existence of spatial dependence, obviously to different levels
and extent.
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migration attitudes by testing the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Differences in (average) anti-immigration attitudes in Eu-
ropean regions are proportional to the distance between regions.
Hypothesis 2: (Average) anti-immigrant attitudes of more populated re-
gions have a stronger effect on (average) attitudes in nearby European
regions than on more distant regions
Hypothesis 3: Anti-immigration attitudes across European regions are
spatially dependent, i.e. more proximate regions have more similar (aver-
age) attitudes, leading to spatial clustering.
3.3 Empirical analysis
3.3.1 Empirical model
The empirical investigation of the spatially dependent diffusion and clus-
tering process of anti-immigration attitudes is performed through esti-





wiktakt + βXit + γi + λt + εit (3.2)
where aik is the value of our dependent variable, i.e. the share of
ESS respondents in region i who expressed hostility towards immigrants
at time t, wikt akt is the spatially lagged dependent variable, Xit is a
vector of control variables, and εit is an identically and independently
distributed (i.i.d.) error process. We also include region-specific fixed
effects (γi) and period fixed effects (λt) to account for unobserved spatial
heterogeneity (or spatial clustering) and to control for common shocks
and time trends.
The spatially lagged attitudinal variable is a composite variable that
combines the three components of a spatially dependent social impact
function a la Latané (1996). It is constituted by the multiplication of
a block-diagonal row-standardized spatial weighting matrix wikt and
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a matrix of the period-specific average of anti-immigrant attitudes in
other regions k, akt.3 The degree of connectivity between pairs of re-
gions i and k over the seven periods of scrutiny is measured by em-
ploying the inverse of the (geographical) distance dik between regions
i and k, multiplied by k’s population size. That is, other regions k are
not weighed equally but proportionally to both their respective popula-
tion size and their respective (inverse) geographical distance to region i.
This interaction captures the dimensions ’immediacy’ and ’strength’ of
anti-immigrant attitudes in other regions relative to attitudes in region i.
As a result, spatial dependence is identified if the weighted average in
immigrant attitudes across all other regions k affect average immigrant
attitudes in region i 6= k.
3.3.2 Data: Anti-immigrant attitudes across European re-
gions
We have used individual-level data from all seven rounds (2002-2014)
of the European Social Survey (ESS) and created from these repeated
cross-sectional survey data a panel dataset with the units of observa-
tion being sub-national regions (rather than individuals). The ESS is an
academically informed cross-national survey that has been conducted
since 2002 (at 2-year intervals) across a varying number of EU and non-
EU countries. It consists of answers to an hour-long questionnaire on
a variety of themes, ranging from subjective well-being to politics and
migration. Demographic, socio-economic, political, and attitudinal vari-
ables have been generated by aggregating individual-level data at the
NUTS2 regional level - based on the 2010 Nomenclature of Units for Ter-
ritorial Statistics (NUTS) classification scheme - through computation of
3For example, if the dependent variable refers to average anti-immigrant attitudes in
region AT11 in year 2004, its spatially lagged equivalent will be the sum of the product
between the connectivity variable (inverse distance between AT11 and all other regions,
respectively, weighted by each respective region’s population size in 2004) and attitudinal
variable in all other regions, one at a time, in 2004. This procedure is repeated for all regions
and all periods in the dataset.
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weighted percentages 4. The aggregation has accounted for changes in
the NUTS classification, such as boundary shifts, mergers and/or splits,
which are proposed by the European Commission at intervals of at least
three years.
As our measure capturing anti-immigrant sentiments, we have used
respondents’ answers to three questions that are included in the ESS
module ’politics’ and have been consistently asked in each of the seven
survey rounds. These questions inquire about respondents’ preferred
levels of immigration and are stated as follows: (a) ‘’To what extent do you
think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most
[country] people to come and live here? ‘’, (b) ‘’ How about people of a different
race or ethnic group from most [country] people? ‘’, and (c) ‘’How about people
from the poorer countries outside Europe? ‘’. Responses are categorised in a
4-point scoring system 5 with 1 representing ‘’allow many to come and
live here‘’, 2 ‘’allow some‘’, 3 ‘’allow a few‘’, and 4 ‘’allow none‘’. For
each of the three questions, we have constructed an ’anti-immigration’
variable 6, where scores are calculated by the weighted percentage of
those who prefer either ‘’allow a few‘’ or ‘’allow none‘’. These three at-
titudinal variables represent the shares of respondents who oppose (a)
immigrants of the same race or ethnic group, (b) immigrants of differ-
ent race or ethnic group or (c) immigrants from poorer countries outside
Europe. Based on information on 203 NUTS2 level regions, table 9 sum-
marizes for each of the 28 European countries in our dataset the num-
ber of ESS rounds for which data at the NUTS2 level were available, the
number of NUTS2 regions in each country, and the weighted averages of
4Following the official ESS recommendation, only the design weight, which corrects for
the fact that in some countries respondents have different probabilities of being part of the
sample due to the sample design used, is applied.
5Davidov (2015) demonstrate that the ESS measurements of anti-immigrant attitudes in
the first six rounds (2002-2012) are ‘’sufficiently similar‘’ across countries to allow mean-
ingful but cautious cross-country comparisons. Meuleman (2012) also find measurement
equivalence of the (first round) ESS scale that refers to opposition against new immigration
in the country.
6We excluded the missing values (‘’refusal‘’, ‘’don’t know‘’, ‘’no answer‘’) from the sam-
ple since a low percentage (below 5 percent) of the answers to each question falls in this
category. Their inclusion as anti- or pro-immigration answers does not question the robust-
ness of the results we report. See also Hainmueller (2007) for similar treatment of missing
data in the European Social Survey.
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anti-immigrant attitudes for the three attitudinal variables 7.
Table 9: Weighted percentage of NUTS population with anti-immigrant at-
titudes (standard deviations in parentheses)
ESS NUTS2 SAME race DIFFERENT POORER countries
Country rounds regions or ethnicity race or ethnicity OUTSIDE Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Austria 6 9 38.53 (12.40) 55.24 (10.07) 56.28 (9.832)
Belgium 3 11 26.08 (7.745) 42.18 (8.525) 44.33 (8.784)
Bulgaria 4 6 24.54 (6.007) 37.12 (6.470) 46.26 (8.388)
Croatia 2 2 35.45 (2.667) 40.50 (3.241) 43.79 (1.927)
Cyprus 4 1 49.34 (20.61) 88.46 (0.936) 91.70 (0.637)
Czech Republic 6 8 51.39 (6.766) 63.24 (8.078) 63.28 (9.493)
Denmark 7 5 17.90 (4.619) 42.46 (7.712) 53.45 (5.986)
Estonia 6 1 34.51 (6.316) 58.66 (6.014) 70.64 (2.905)
Finland 3 5 34.81 (8.800) 50.26 (14.55) 61.20 (13.79)
France 3 21 30.02 (10.01) 43.17 (10.16) 49.84 (10.22)
Greece 3 13 63.27 (14.92) 85.21 (7.713) 85.48 (7.951)
Hungary 7 7 45.67 (9.524) 80.51 (5.543) 84.93 (5.453)
Iceland 2 1 8.321 (2.699) 29.44 (5.754) 28.08 (5.143)
Ireland 6 2 31.45 (9.016) 40.89 (7.409) 44.41 (10.33)
Italy 3 20 30.56 (12.05) 38.80 (13.67) 39.53 (13.31)
Latvia 1 1 44.96 (.) 62.67 (.) 75.50 (.)
Lithuania 3 1 24.19 (4.589) 35.52 (5.962) 49.60 (9.676)
Luxembourg 2 1 37.12 (7.013) 52.70 (1.591) 51.95 (1.285)
Netherlands 7 12 34.80 (7.623) 40.71 (8.772) 47.27 (7.441)
Norway 7 7 21.91 (5.390) 36.62 (8.494) 37.74 (5.613)
Poland 7 16 25.38 (8.329) 35.47 (10.28) 35.30 (11.89)
Portugal 4 5 54.41 (13.23) 60.11 (13.04) 62.80 (9.900)
Romania 1 8 40.37 (10.30) 48.23 (8.157) 50.76 (8.420)
Slovakia 5 4 36.78 (9.541) 47.52 (9.476) 47.73 (11.61)
Slovenia 7 2 29.99 (6.354) 39.57 (6.588) 46.50 (5.581)
Spain 7 19 43.64 (15.20) 47.25 (14.84) 48.23 (15.32)
Sweden 7 8 9.415 (3.557) 13.10 (4.784) 14.34 (4.703)
Switzerland 7 7 17.91 (5.224) 37.67 (8.374) 39.59 (9.191)
Notes. Standard deviation for Latvia cannot be computed since data were available for only 1 round (due to
unavailability of design weights for ESS round 3) and its NUTS2 division corresponds with the entire country.
The weighted percentages refer to people who selected the two most negative categories, i.e., “allow few” and
“allow none”, when answering the survey questions.
In most European countries, preferences over immigration levels seem
heavily contingent upon the type of (potential) immigrants. For instance,
the regionally weighted percentage of survey respondents in Cyprus and
Hungary expressing negative attitudes against immigrants is about 39
7Although participating in one or more rounds of the ESS survey, we have excluded
from our analysis the following countries (and corresponding regions): (1) Israel, Ukraine
and Russia, which are not covered by the NUTS and use their own regional classification;
(2) Albania, as there were no related data on NUTS distances; (3) Kosovo, which is not
a member state, but a potential candidate for EU accession under UNSCR 1244/99; (4)
Latvia (ESS round 3), Lithuania (ESS round 4) and Romania (ESS round 3), as data on de-
sign weights were not available. Six countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Luxembourg) have one NUTS2 region, i.e., their NUTS2 division corresponds to the
entire country, and two of them (Latvia and Romania) appear in only one round due to
unavailability of design weights.
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and 35 percentage points, respectively, lower when referring to immi-
grants of the same race (Column 4) than if asked about immigrants of
different ethnicity (Column 5). The difference is even more pronounced
when opinions concern immigrants from poorer countries outside Eu-
rope (Column 6): here about 92 percent of survey respondents in Cyprus
and 85 percent of those in Hungary display negative attitudes in terms
of a preference for lower immigration levels of these groups. Hostility
seems less dependent on those categories of immigrants in the cases of
Portugal, Spain, or Sweden. For instance, the average share of respon-
dents in Spain opposing inflows of migrants of the same race or ethnic-
ity is nearly the same as the average share of those opposing immigrants
of different race or ethnicity or from poorer countries outside Europe.
Overall, Sweden appears as the most immigrant-friendly country in the
sample, with only 9.41 (13.10) percent of respondents reporting a prefer-
ence for lower levels of immigrants of the same (different) race or ethnic
group.
As a measure of cross-regional variation in anti-immigrant attitudes
over time, columns (4)-(6) of table 9 report also respective standard devi-
ations (in parentheses). Attitudes towards immigrants of the same race
or ethnicity appear remarkably heterogeneous in Cyprus, Greece, and
Spain, but more clustered around the average in Croatia, Iceland, and
Sweden. In Greece, for instance, the percentage of respondents showing
hostility to immigrants of the same race or ethnicity oscillates between
a 33.56 (Western Macedonia in 2004) lower bound and a 90.51 (North
Aegean in 2004) upper bound. Attitudes towards immigrants of differ-
ent race or ethnicity or towards immigrants from poorer countries out-
side Europe, instead, appear more dispersed around the weighted av-
erage in Finland, Italy, and Spain, but rather consistent in Croatia, Lux-
embourg, Cyprus, and Sweden. In Sweden, for instance, the share of
those opposing immigrants of different race or ethnicity ranges between
4.25 (Middle Norrland in 2014) and 23.62 (Småland and the islands in
2004) percent. Minimum and maximum values for each country and by
type of immigrants are reported in table A6 in the Appendix. Attitudes
towards migrants in Europe do not seem to show a clear overall trend
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Figure 6: Anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe, 2002-2014. The vertical axis
represents the percentage of anti-immigrant population in Europe and the
horizontal axis indicates the respective period of time (year) for which the
indicator was analysed.
between 2002 and 2014, contrary to what the past and the current state
of the economy, nature of some recently adopted (restrictive) migration
policies, and growing support for far-right political parties and media
portrayals would suggest. Figure 6 provides an overall picture of the
trends in anti-immigrant attitudes by type of immigrants in Europe.
Except for a modest upward trend between 2006 and 2010, presum-
ably reflecting the underlying global financial meltdown and the subse-
quent European sovereign debt crisis, the percentage of Europeans op-
posing immigrants of the same (different) race or ethnicity as (from) the
majority has dropped by almost 7 (5) percentage points between 2002
and 2014. Conversely, opposition to immigrants from poorer countries
outside Europe has moderately but continuously increased: the percent-
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age of Europeans who felt that a few or none of these migrants should be
allowed to come to their countries has increased from 48 percent in 2002
to 52 percent in 2014.
Table 10 summarizes variations in anti-immigrant attitudes at the
country level. Focusing on the countries where data was collected in both
2002 and 2014, only Ireland, Czech Republic and the United Kingdom
have become more negative towards immigrants of the same race or eth-
nicity. Particularly, the percentage of Irish opponents has risen by about
14 percentage points between 2002 and 2014, while that of Czechs has
almost doubled over the same period, reaching 41 percent in 2014, and
that of the British has increased by 2.4 percentage points. When asked
about immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, Belgian, Dan-
ish, Dutch, Polish, Slovenian, Spanish, and Swiss respondents have been
expressing increasingly hostile views, too. Variations have been quite
remarkable in the case of Switzerland, where the share of immigration
opponents has increased by more than 15 percentage points in 2014 rel-
ative to 2002, and rather moderate in all the remaining countries, where
the rise in opposition has ranged between 3 and 9 percentage points.
The negative trend in Ireland, particularly during the period 2008-
2012, might be reflective of its dramatic socio-economic situation, char-
acterized by a significant decline in GDP growth and a concurrent sharp
increase in unemployment causing massive protests and rallies. Portu-
gal, another Eurozone member state who was severely affected by the
sovereign debt crisis, with unemployment rates leaping to 16 percent
in 2012 and GDP growth rates plummeting to minus 4 percent in 2012
(World Bank 2017), has also been showing increasingly more hostile atti-
tudes towards migrants between 2008 and 2012. Spain represents a no-
ticeable exception: despite very high unemployment, which went up to
more than 24 percent in 2012 from 11 percent in 2006 (World Bank 2017),
and negative or stagnating GDP growth between 2010 and 2012 (World
Bank 2017), the percentage of Spanish people who felt that none or only a
few immigrants should be allowed to come to their country has actually
diminished considerably between 2008 and 2012.
Shifting the focus of our investigation to the sub-national level, sev-
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Table 10: Country-level variation over time in anti-immigrant attitudes be-
tween 2002 and 2014
Country SAME race DIFFERENT POORER countries
or ethnicity race or ethnicity outside Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria -23.625 -15.996 -9.413
Belgium -0.601 0.825 9.425
Czech Republic 13.891 19.931 24.236
Denmark -5.156 -6.189 5.122
France -9.030 -7.994 -1.259
Germany -15.921 -20.540 -10.245
Hungary -4.668 -6.532 -2.610
Ireland 20.751 13.788 22.599
Netherlands -7.311 -8.266 4.120
Norway -12.314 -19.843 -6.271
Poland -0.328 -1.345 3.828
Portugal -19.598 -14.233 -9.504
Slovenia -8.569 -8.152 4.270
Spain -5.616 -0.098 1.817
Sweden -5.518 -9.218 -2.180
Switzerland -1.682 6.314 17.433
United Kingdom 2.382 -5.814 6.529
Notes. The table reports only the countries where data was available both in 2002 and in 2014. Figures
for Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are obtained after averaging anti-immigrant
attitudes at the NUTS1 level.
eral patterns are worth highlighting. Table A7 in the appendix reports
variations in anti-immigrant attitudes across all European NUTS2 re-
gions where data were available in both 2002 and 2014.
Over this time period, all Austrian states but K’́arnten, known as the
stronghold state of the anti-immigrant FP’́O party, have been displaying
a greater openness to immigrants. In Salzburg, for example, the percent-
age of those with negative attitudes towards immigrants of different race
or ethnicity has fallen by almost 30 percentage points, down from 68.20
percent in 2002 to 38.26 percent in 2014. Likewise, after years of strong
hostility with percentages of the anti-immigrant population ranging be-
tween 50 and 80 percent, Portugal has undergone a marked shift towards
more favourable attitudes in 2014, concordant with the recorded post-
crisis recovery on the labour market and the country’s return to economic
growth. On the contrary, all Czech regions have become more opposed
to inflows of migrants, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or country of
origin. Swiss regions have followed this negative trend too, mainly re-
garding immigrants of a different race or ethnic group or from poorer
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countries outside Europe as unwelcome.
In Spain, internal (Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, and Madrid),
north-western (Galicia and Cantabria), and eastern (Catalonia and Va-
lencian Community) regions have generally been moving towards more
positive attitudes about immigrants, while north-eastern (Navarre, La
Rioja, and Aragon) and southern (Andalusia and region of Murcia) re-
gions have increased their opposition to further immigration. In this
context, various geographical clusters have emerged, with geographi-
cally more proximate regions appearing to share stronger similarities in
trends of anti-immigrant attitudes than more distant ones. For exam-
ple, Castile-Leon and Castile-La Mancha have been initially displaying
extremely hostile attitudes towards migrants but, from 2010 onwards,
contrary to what rising unemployment rates and declining per capita
GDP would suggest, have been characterized by increased openness,
with shares of opponents declining between 13 and 27 percentage points.
Conversely, in Extremadura, Andalusia, and Region of Murcia, people’s
willingness to allow migrants to enter their regions dropped drastically
between 2002 and 2014. Particularly, in Extremadura, the percentage of
those unwilling to accept further inflows of immigrants of different race
or ethnicity rose by more than 25 percentage points, from nearly 27 per-
cent in 2002 up to almost 53 percent in 2014.
In Hungary, there appears a pattern of anti-immigrant attitudes clus-
tered at the higher NUTS1 hierarchical level. Against trends in media
coverage, Észak-Magyarorszàg, Észak-Alföld, and Dél-Alföld, which are
comprised in the Alföld és Észak NUTS1 region, as well as Közép-Dunántúl
and Nyugat-Dunántúl, which are part of the Dunántúl NUTS1 region,
have become more open to inflows of immigrants over the period 2002-
2014. The decline in anti-immigrant sentiments, however, have rather
been modest; in 2014, on average, three out of four Hungarians were
still unwilling to allow immigrants of different race or ethnicity and mi-
grants from outside-Europe poorer countries to come to their regions.
Facing high-level anti-immigrant attitudes already in 2002, the Közép-
Magyarország region has seen further increases in hostile attitudes to-
wards immigrants between 2002 and 2014, with the percentage of the
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anti-immigrant population reaching 91 percent in 2014, a 7.35 percentage
point increase compared to the already high figures recorded in 2002.
Slovenia shares a similar attitudinal trend towards more benevolence
regarding the inflow of immigrants of the same or different race or eth-
nicity as some neighbouring regions, i.e., the Hungarian Nyugat-Dunántúl
in the northeast, the Croatian Kontinentalna Hrvatska and Jadranska
Hrvatska in the south and southeast, and the Austrian Burgenland and
Steiermark in the north. Conversely, the percentage of Slovenians with
favourable attitudes to migrants from poorer countries outside Europe
has declined by almost 4 percentage points in 2014 relative to 2002. A
similar trend in bifurcating attitudes, i.e., more negative towards mi-
grants from poorer countries outside Europe and more positive towards
migrants of the same or different race or ethnic group, has also char-
acterized most of the regions in Poland and Netherlands. Particularly
in Poland, exceptions concern the mid-north and eastern regions, where
people’s unwillingness to allow further migrant inflows has increased
remarkably between 2002 and 2014 regardless of the migrant’s category,
and the north-western and north-central regions, where the opposite vari-
ation has occurred. Interestingly, all regions of the Nordic countries have
consistently been displaying changes towards more favourable attitudes
towards any type of immigrants.
Figures 7 and 10 provide an illustration of the region-specific distri-
bution of negative attitudes towards immigrants of the same race or eth-
nicity (Figure 7) and immigrants of different race or ethnicity (Figure 10)8.
Important to note is that the map in Figure 10 is markedly darker than
the one in Figure 7 which indicates the fact that attitudes towards immi-
grants of the same race or ethnicity as the host country’s majority pop-
ulation appear generally less negative than those towards immigrants
of different race or ethnicity. Also, anti-immigrant attitudes tend to vary
across regions within the same country. In Spain, for instance, the av-
erage percentage of respondents with negative attitudes towards immi-
8We also draw a map that depicts average attitudes towards immigrants from poorer
countries outside Europe - figure B6 of the Appendix. Patterns do not seem to differ much
from those of Figure 10.
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grants of different race or ethnicity is noticeably high in Castilla y León,
but rather moderate in Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana, Islas Baleares,
and some Northern regions such as Principado de Asturias, Cantabria,
and Comunidad Autónoma del Pas Vasco. Similarly, in France, the aver-
age percentage of those preferring lower levels of immigration of differ-
ent race or ethnicity fluctuates between 31 and 46.5 percent in all regions
but Limousin, Burgundy, and Champagne-Ardenne, where opposition
to these immigrant flows are significantly stronger. Furthermore, anti-
immigrant attitudes seem to be clustered in some contiguous European
(NUTS2) regions, which suggests that, by and large, spatially more prox-
imate regions exhibit greater similarities in average anti-immigrant atti-
tudes than more distant regions.
To explore this hypothesis further, we compute for each of the three
‘groups’ of immigrants the ‘bilateral’ difference in the percentage of re-
spective NUTS2 populations that have anti-immigrant attitudes and regress
these non-linearly against the distance between NUTS2 regions. Figure
11 displays the three fitted lines with 95 percent confidence intervals.
They all indicate a positive association between the distance (in km) be-
tween regions and the differences in anti-immigrant attitudes. Interest-
ingly, differences between European regions in negative attitudes against
immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe are more marked than
those towards immigrants of the same or a different race/ethnicity.
3.3.3 Data: Control variables
In order to control for other factors that the immigrant attitudes litera-
ture has identified, we use the weighted percentages of respondents at
NUTS2 regions who (i) are born in the country where the interview took
place (native); (ii) live in a rural area by choosing the response option
‘’country village‘’ or ‘’farm or home in the countryside‘’ (rural); (iii) are
highly interested in politics (politics); (iv) deem it important to live in se-
cure and safe surroundings (safety); (v) have high levels of interpersonal
trust (trust); (vi) are male (male); and (vii) have completed more than nine
years of education, with nine years denoting the typical cumulative du-
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Figure 7: Geography of anti-immigrant attitudes towards migrants of the
SAME race or ethnicity. Lichtenstein, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Malta
- black-highlighted - do not participate in the ESS survey. There are miss-
ing data also for the French Corsica region. Only data for one round are
available for the following: 5 Italian regions (Molise, Provincia Autonoma di
Trento, Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Emilia-Romagna, and Marche), and all
the regions of Romania and Latvia (due to unavailability of design weights
for ESS round 3). Since the ESS provides no NUTS2 level classification for
Germany, Turkey, and United Kingdom, the related averages are computed
based on NUTS1 data.
ration of ISCED level 1 plus ISCED level 2 (education).
We have further included in the analysis the weighted average of re-
spondents’ age (age). Data on the unemployment rates among persons
aged 15 and over (unemployment), as well as data on distances between
NUTS2 regions and population size involved in the creation of spatial
weighting matrices and spatial lag variables, are drawn from the EU-
ROSTAT regional statistics database. Table A4 in the Appendix reports
some descriptive statistics on these variables: about 93 percent of the re-
spondents are not foreign-born; about 43 percent live in a rural area; 83.5
percent assign great importance to live in safe and secure surroundings,
and slightly less than half of the respondents declare a high interest in
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Figure 8: Geography of anti-attitudes towards immigrants of DIFFERENT
race or ethnicity. Lichtenstein, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Malta - black-
highlighted - do not participate in the ESS survey. There are missing data
also for the French Corsica region. Only data for one round are available for
the following: 5 Italian regions (Molise, Provincia Autonoma di Trento, Provin-
cia Autonoma di Bolzano, Emilia-Romagna, and Marche), and all the regions
of Romania and Latvia (due to unavailability of design weights for ESS
round 3). Since the ESS provides no NUTS2 level classification for Germany,
Turkey, and United Kingdom, the related averages are computed based on
NUTS1 data.
politics and more than three-quarters have completed more than nine
years of education.
Education is anticipated to positively influence attitudes towards im-
migrants via economic and non-economic channels. From an economic
perspective, if assumed that the host country’s labour market cannot ab-
sorb immigrants by altering its output mix, an inflow of unskilled mi-
grants raises the supply of unskilled labour relative to other factors of
production, which drives upwards skilled wages and downwards un-
skilled ones. Consequently, people are expected to favour immigrants
with skill endowments that are dissimilar to their own. From a rather
non-economic perspective, however, education is expected to have a pos-
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Figure 9: Size of attitudinal differences across European regions by distance.
Differences in attitudes between NUTS2 regions are expressed in absolute
terms.
itive impact on attitudes towards immigrants through improving the
opportunities to know foreign cultures, facilitating the creation of cos-
mopolitan social networks, promoting higher levels of racial tolerance,
and favouring more critical habits of thought (Burns (2000); Case (1989);
Chandler (2001); Citrin (1997); Espenshade (1993); Hainmueller (2007,
2010)).
Interest in politics is expected to favour more positive attitudes to-
wards immigrants via its correlation with higher education and involve-
ment in society (Rustenbach (2010)). People with high levels of interper-
sonal trust are also expected to have positive attitudes as they ‘’may be
more likely to overcome the uncertainty associated with the unknown
and either establish relationships with immigrants or simply trust that
the differences will not have negative consequences‘’ (Rustenbach (2010)).
Living in rural areas is expected to be associated with heightened oppo-
sition to immigrants: unlike in big cities, rural areas offer less economic
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and social opportunities, therefore attracting fewer migrants, which makes
it less likely for their inhabitants to have contact with members of other
groups and, consequentially enhancing opportunities for prejudice to
arise (Allport (1954); Markaki (2013); Pettigrew (1998)). Living in a re-
gion or country characterised by more unfavourable economic condi-
tions, e.g., higher levels of unemployment, is also expected to increase
hostility to newcomers. Similarly, attaching greater importance to liv-
ing in a secure and safe neighbourhood is expected to be associated with
stronger anti-immigrant attitudes as immigrants might be perceived as
a source of uncertainty, instability and insecurity and, potentially, more
prone to take part in illegal activities (Rustenbach (2010)).
3.4 Results
Table 11 reports estimation results of equation 3.1, regressing the per-
centage of respondents who express anti-immigrant attitudes towards
immigrants of the same race or ethnic group as the majority population
(Columns 1-3); immigrants of a different race or ethnic group from ma-
jority population (Columns 4-6); and, immigrants from poorer countries
outside Europe (Columns 7-9). The first model specifications (Columns
1, 4, and 7) include only spatial lag terms with NUTS level-2 fixed effects.
Other specifications include further control variables and additional pe-
riod fixed effects.
The estimated coefficients of the spatial lag variable, which was de-
fined as the percentage of NUTS 2 populations in all other European re-
gions weighted by the (inverse) distance between regions, are all posi-
tive and statistically significant. This indicates a significant spatial con-
nectivity of anti-immigrant attitudes: more proximate European regions,
in terms of geographic distance, are found to exhibit greater similarity
in trends of anti-immigrant attitudes than more distant regions. These
estimates corroborate the implications of the dynamic social impact the-
ory: people tend to be more influenced by their immediate neighbours
than those further away, which ‘’gives rise to local patterns of consen-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































initially random distributions of social attributes to become clustered in
space and correlated, with less popular elements becoming consolidated
or reduced in frequency but surviving in minority subgroups‘’ (Latané
(1996)).
The row-standardization of the weighting matrix allows interpreta-
tion of the estimated coefficients of the spatial lag variable as the ap-
proximate strength of spatial interconnectedness (Plümper (2010)): a one
percentage point increase in the percentage of respondents with anti-
immigrant attitudes against immigrants of the same race or ethnicity as
the majority population in spatially more proximate regions is estimated
to raise the percentage of respondents with similar anti-immigrant at-
titudes in the reference region by 0.480 percentage points (Column 2),
holding all other independent variables constant. The degree of spa-
tial dependence becomes even stronger when period fixed effects are ac-
counted for or when employing negative attitudes towards immigrants
of different race or ethnicity as the dependent variable (Column 5). For
instance, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of those who
oppose further inflows of immigrants of different race or ethnicity in spa-
tially closer regions is associated with a rise in the percentage of those
sharing similar adverse immigrant attitudes in the region under consid-
eration by 0.504 percentage points (Column 5).
Political interest and interpersonal trust turn out to be strong and ro-
bust predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes. Both variables exhibit neg-
ative and statistically significant estimates that remain robust across all
alternative model specifications. Being (quite or very) interested in pol-
itics and more prone to trust others appear both linked to more tolerant
attitudes towards any types of immigrants: a one percentage point in-
crease in the share of people who are interested in politics - versus those
who are not - or a same magnitude increase in the share of those with
high levels of interpersonal trust -versus those who think that careful-
ness is never enough when dealing with other people - are associated,
respectively, with a 0.403 or 0.158 percentage point fall in the share of
people showing negative attitudes towards immigrants of the same race
or ethnicity (Column 2), holding all other control variables constant. The
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size of the effect of a one percentage point increase in the share of peo-
ple interested in politics on the share of people having anti-immigrant
sentiments declines though when shifting the focus of the analysis to
immigrants of different race or ethnicity or to immigrants from poorer
countries outside Europe, but goes up again when year fixed effects are
included in the model specification.
A possible explanation for the negative sign characterizing the re-
lationship between political interest and anti-immigrant attitudes lies
in the positive correlation (see cross-correlations in table A5 in the Ap-
pendix) between political interest and higher levels of education: people
with a remarkable interest in politics are more likely to display favourable
attitudes towards immigrants for the same reasons as educated people
do. Indeed, education ’improves the opportunities to encounter diverse
social groups and cultural lifestyles, exposes members to more universal-
istic and cosmopolitan cultural traditions, and institutionalizes written
communication that extends one’s experiences beyond reference groups.
In this way, education relativizes strong commitments to specific in-groups
that control members’ self-identification and that tend to create ‘’preju-
diced‘’ cognitions and attitudes toward non-members and out-groups’
(Case (1989)). Hainmueller (2007) refer to the same argument to explain
the finding that people with higher education and skills are more likely
to favour immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants,
in contrast with the predictions of the labour-market competition hy-
pothesis that anticipate people’s opposition to immigrants with similar
skills to their own and people’s support for immigrants with different
skill levels.
Granting greater importance to living in safe and secure surround-
ings seems to foster animosity towards immigrants of different race or
ethnicity and towards immigrants from non-European poorer countries,
but not towards immigrants of the same race or ethnicity. On average,
immigrants from non-European poorer countries are more likely to be
less educated, to have poorer employment prospects and to face higher
barriers to economic and social integration and thus, are more likely to
engage in illegal (informal) activities. The fear of potentially increasing
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illegality associated with inflows of this type of immigrants might ease
the formation of anti-immigrant sentiments among people who deem it
critical to living in a secure and safe place relative to people who are not
much or not at all concerned about security issues. Particularly, we esti-
mate that a one percentage point increase in the share of those who value
highly living in a secure and safe area (versus those who value it less) is
associated with a 0.143 percentage point increase in the share of those
opposing inflows of immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
(Column 8). Immigrants who are culturally or ethnically different from
the host region’s majority population seem to be perceived as sources of
social instability and insecurity, at least more so than immigrants with
similar racial or ethnic backgrounds, which may explain the existence
(absence) of a positive relationship between attributing higher impor-
tance to living in a secure and safe place, and having negative attitudes
towards immigrants of a different (same) race or ethnicity.
Cross-regional variation in anti-immigrant attitudes is also partly cap-
tured by the share of people living in rural areas. The estimated coeffi-
cients are all positive, highly significant, and robust across alternative
specifications: for instance, a one percentage point increase in the per-
centage of people living in a rural area corresponds to a 0.179 increase in
the percentage of people opposing higher levels of immigrants of differ-
ent race or ethnicity than the majority population (Column 5). Notewor-
thy is also the (positive) effect of the native variable on average attitudes
towards immigrants of a different race or ethnicity but not when attitudes
refer to immigrants of the same race or ethnicity as the country’s major-
ity population. Overall, socio-cultural and ethnic considerations appear
to weigh more than economic concerns in the formation of negative atti-
tudes towards immigrants.
3.5 Robustness
We test the robustness of these results in various ways. First, we con-
struct and test an alternative spatial lag variable by using contiguity
rather than (inverse) distance as connectivity matrix. Second, we further
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expand model specifications by including additional controls at both re-
gional (population density and crude rate of net migration) and country
levels. The population density variable is intended to capture implica-
tions of intergroup contact theory (Allport (1954)), whereas the crude
rate of net migration is assumed to account for the size of the immi-
grant population argument. Additionally, we include migration and in-
tegration policy controls at country level (based on DEMIG POLICY and
MIPEX data, respectively) which shall pick up effects of respective pol-
icy changes on attitudes towards immigrants as suggested by Schlueter
(2013)9. Third, in order to account for the nested-level error structure,
we also estimate a three-level mixed-effects model with data recorded
over the period 2002 to 2014 with NUTS2 regions grouped into coun-
tries and random intercepts at both the country and the region-within-
country levels. By and large, significance and magnitude of the estimated
coefficients of the spatial anti-immigrant attitudes variable do not vary
considerably across these specifications. The only case where the sig-
nificance of the spatial lag variable disappears is when period fixed ef-
fects are included in the regression on attitudes against immigrants from
poorer countries outside Europe. In all other models, spatial dependence
terms remain unaffected by variation in specifications10. Consequently,
we are confident that spatial dependence in anti-immigrant attitudes is a
relevant social phenomenon that deserves further exploration.
3.6 Conclusions
Perceptions and beliefs that immigrants pose a threat to the economic,
cultural, and social status quo and future prospects of the majority popu-
lation have, reportedly, been playing a critical role across Europe over the
past decade. European societies and institutions seem to be challenged
by an increasing trend in immigration, but even more by the broadening
electoral support for far-right and populist parties across Europe. This
9Schlueter (2013) demonstrate that immigrant integration policies that are more permis-
sive are associated with decreased perceptions of group threat from immigrants.
10Results are available upon request.
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trend may not only challenge the foundation and integration of the ‘Eu-
ropean project’, but it has already led to some political backlash in terms
of a tightening of immigration policies across Europe - even in some of
the more welcoming countries. Drawing upon data from seven rounds
(2002-2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS), we have performed an
empirical investigation of the drivers of inter-regional differences and
variation in attitudes towards three different types of immigrants: those
of the same race or ethnicity, different race or ethnicity, or from poorer
countries outside Europe. Our findings suggest that people who have
a more marked interest in politics and a greater tendency to trust oth-
ers appear associated with more tolerant attitudes towards immigrants.
People who attribute greater importance to living in safe and secure sur-
roundings and having a domicile in rural areas are found to be associated
with growing hostility towards further immigrant flows.
The main contribution though of this study is the application of dy-
namic social impact theory (Latané (1981, 1996)) on the analysis of atti-
tudes towards immigrants. We hereby test the existence of spatial de-
pendence between cross-regional attitudes towards immigrants. This
empirical specification has allowed us to test the concepts of immedi-
acy and closeness in space to investigate the extent to which hostility
against immigrants is dependent on the spatial distance between Euro-
pean regions, which may ultimately lead to a diffusion of anti-immigrant
attitudes across Europe at sub-national levels. Our empirical results pro-
vide evidence for the existence of a significant spatial connectivity of
anti-immigrant attitudes at sub-national levels, with spatially more prox-
imate regions exhibiting greater similarity in anti-immigrant attitudes
than more distant regions. We argue hereby that people’s attitudes about
immigration are influenced by the local and regional environment, which
is the people they are surrounded by and are exposed to. This implies,
in accordance with Tobler’s first law of geography and in the spirit of
Latané’s social impact theory, that immigrant attitudes in one region are
more influenced by respective attitudes in nearby regions than to those
of more distant ones.
The identification of a spatially dependent process in the diffusion
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and clustering of anti-immigrant attitudes has a significant bearing for
understanding the rise and fall of populist movements across Europe
and changing electoral support for xenophobic parties across European
regions over time. Clustering of populations with anti-immigrant at-
titudes, however, may not only be influenced by xenophobic popula-
tions living in nearby regions or the presence of factors that facilitate
anti-immigrant attitudes such as economic hardship or an isolated social
environment, but also by internal migration or ‘sorting’ processes them-
selves. People with more liberal attitudes may move to regions with a
greater presence of like-minded others, while those with more nativist
attitudes may do the same. This may lead, at least to some extent and
only in the long term, to a ‘population re-sorting’ along attitudinal cat-
egories creating spatially more homogeneous clusters of anti-immigrant
populations. A test of this hypothesis, however, was beyond the scope
of this study as information on bilateral migration patterns at European







International research collaborations of individual scientists or larger re-
search groups are a vital feature of the contemporary global scientific
and innovation system. Central to creating and spreading new scientific
knowledge across national and international boundaries, they spur tech-
nological progress, innovation, and ultimately, economic development.
They are closely linked to migration and mobility of scientists, too.
Both short-term movements such as conference attendances, research
visits, doctoral and post-doctoral studies abroad, and longer-term mi-
gration for academic employment are usually beneficial from an indi-
vidual perspective. Moving overseas may increase scientific productivity
through the acquisition of new knowledge and skills, but also provide ac-
cess to scientific networks and new opportunities for collaboration (Katz
and Martin (1997)). At the same time, while beneficial for individual sci-
entists, the scientific capacity of institutions and former colleagues may
shrink if leading scientist move abroad.
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Progress in communication and transport technologies has eased con-
siderably interactions between scientists, even when separated by great
distances. However, the expectation that physical mobility would have,
in turn, been replaced by long-distance virtual collaborations has not
been confirmed (Stichweh (1996)). Physical co-location is still identi-
fied as a critical factor in facilitating the transfer and exchange of (tacit)
knowledge through face-to-face interaction and informal communica-
tion (Katz and Martin (1997); Scellato et al. (2015); Stephan (2010)). It con-
tributes to lessening asymmetric information among potential co-authors
and to lowering both search and ‘’joint execution costs‘’ (Boudreau et al.
(2017); Catalini (2017)). Yet, close spatial proximity is not always easy to
attain due to such factors as travel barriers.
This paper addresses the fundamental question about the extent to
which scientific migration and mobility barriers shape international re-
search collaborations. To this purpose, we estimate gravity-type models
by a Pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood estimator (Silva and Tenreyro
(2006)) through data on visa restrictions as well as information collected
from Elsevier’s Scopus database on the volume and direction of interna-
tional scientific mobility and research collaborations while controlling for
contextual factors such as bilateral trade flows, bilateral distance, com-
mon language, common colonizer, colonial historical links, and common
currency. We find evidence of (i) geographical distance representing a
strong obstacle for international research collaborations; (ii) common lan-
guage, colonial ties and economic linkages between countries being a fa-
cilitating factor on the other hand; (iii) a positive relationship between
mobility of scientists and research collaborations; and (iv) a robust de-
terrence effect of visa restrictions, both unilateral and bilateral, on the
number of international research collaborations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 dis-
cusses previous studies on linkages between scientific migration and re-
search collaborations. Section 4.3 scrutinizes academic literature on the
detrimental effects of administrative barriers to mobility and their inter-
connectedness with research collaborations. Data are illustrated in detail
in Section 4.4, whereas the empirical methodology and the estimation
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outputs are debated in Section 4.5. Conclusions are then put forth in the
respective section.
4.2 Scientific migration and research collabora-
tions
Globalization as a multidimensional process manifests itself in the rapid
increase of multiple forms of international flows such as capital, trade,
but also information, knowledge and people (Castles et al. (2014); Held
et al. (2000); Sassen (1991)). Migration systems theory proposes that one
form of flow between countries or institutions, such as scientific knowl-
edge, triggers and mutually reinforce other types of flows, such as move-
ment of scientists (Kritz et al. (1992); Mabogunje (1970); Massey et al.
(1993)). Zelinsky (1971) characterises advanced societies by the pres-
ence of significant international migration or circulation flows of highly
skilled workers and professionals. For various parts of the world, this
description has become a reality. The so-called brain circulation (Ackers
(2005); Saxenian (2005)) with its positive connotations is a more recent
trend in the controversial ‘brain drain-brain gain’ debate, which is ongo-
ing since the early 1960s.
The assumption that brain circulation is a useful and desirable pro-
cess and mechanism of international knowledge transfer and dissemina-
tion has been challenged by others who describe the flow of scientists
as unidirectional from less to more developed (scientifically more attrac-
tive and competitive) places (Meyer et al. (2001)). Guellec and Cervantes
(2001) argue that the international mobility of scientists has positive ef-
fects on skill-matches and intensified knowledge transfer, although at
the cost of an uneven distribution of net benefits, which remain predom-
inantly on the side that is already scientifically advanced. The distribu-
tional effects of international research mobility remain unclear and are
still highly contested as there is insufficient evidence to ascertain whether
and what regions, countries and institutions benefit more from scientific
migration and mobility and which benefit rather less or lose out. Con-
sequently, and despite the fact that international research collaborations
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have intensified remarkably as scientific mobility and the interconnect-
edness of scientists have increased (Jeong et al. (2013); Wagner and Ley-
desdorff (2005)), recent studies suggest that this internationalisation of
scientific activity does not necessarily benefit all countries in a similar
way and extent (Castellacci and Archibugi (2008); Horlings and Van den
Besselaar (2013)). We add to this discussion by investigating the extent to
which scientific movements contribute to the dissemination of scientific
knowledge through international research collaborations.
Migration and mobility of scientists are both a cause of international
knowledge transfer but also a consequence of international differences
in the scientific opportunities and research environments (Ackers (2005);
King (2002); Pearson and Morrell (2002)). Several drivers have been iden-
tified as influential in scientists’ migration and mobility decisions and
career trajectories. For instance: the prestige and scientific quality of re-
search institutions and universities, or even entire countries; the role of
socio-scientific and professional networks (Bauder (2012); Williams et al.
(2004)); economic and non-economic factors, including those related to
individual life-cycles (Ackers and Oliver (2005); Czaika and Toma (2017);
Stephan (2010)).
International research collaborations, on the other hand, have been
growing markedly, both in magnitude and relevance, over the last decades
(Adams (2005); Jones et al. (2008); Luukkonen et al. (1992, 1993); Narin
and Whitlow (1990); Wuchty et al. (2007)). Previous studies have empha-
sized different factors to account for this remarkable upward trend: the
desire to work physically closer to others to benefit from their (embod-
ied, or rather ‘’em-brained‘’) knowledge, skills, and techniques (Beaver
and Rosen (1978, 1979a,b); Katz and Martin (1997)); the deepening cross-
fertilization across disciplines (Beaver and Rosen (1978, 1979a,b); Katz
and Martin (1997); Melin (2000)); the increasing need to pool one’s knowl-
edge with others to tackle global complex challenges and provide orig-
inal and significant contributions (Beaver (2001); Goffman et al. (1980));
the rising specialisation within certain fields (Bush and Hattery (1956);
Melin (2000); Smith (1958)); the desire of researchers to enhance their
popularity and visibility in the scientific community (Beaver and Rosen
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(1978, 1979a); Beaver (2001); Beaver and Rosen (1979b); Katz and Martin
(1997)) as well as their personal productivity and likelihood to publish
in journals with higher impact factor (Freeman and Huang (2015); Katz
and Hicks (1997); Lawani (1986); Wuchty et al. (2007)); or, the need to
gain access to state-of-the-art facilities, instrumentation or infrastructure
(Freeman et al. (2014); Katz and Hicks (1997)).
The use of e-mail, fax machines, the Internet, (multi-point) video con-
ferencing, and the availability of high-speed train and cheaper airfares
have made interactions between researchers far more accessible, even
when long distances separate them. Catalini et al. (2016) find that the
availability of lower flight fares is associated with a 50 percent increase
in chemistry collaborations; Agrawal and Goldfarb (2008) also report a
40 percent rise, on average, in electrical engineering collaborations fol-
lowing the adoption of Bitnet, an Internet predecessor. However, the
expectation that digitalisation and the availability of information and
communication technology (ICT) would have made ‘physical mobility’
of scientists more superfluous, as partly replaced by long-distance virtual
collaboration, has not been confirmed, but rather the contrary Stichweh
(1996).
ICT is not a substitute, but rather a complement for face-to-face in-
teractions (Gaspar and Glaeser (1996)). In a field experiment conducted
within the Harvard Medical School system of hospitals and research cen-
tres, Boudreau et al. (2017) find that being in the same room during a
research symposium raises by almost 70 percent the propensity of any
two researchers to co-apply for a grant. Similarly, Chai (2014) docu-
ments a positive effect of temporary co-location and face-to-face inter-
actions at conferences and subsequent long-term collaborations. Using
co-publications among physicists of the French Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) over the period 1992-1997, Mairesse and
Turner (2005) estimate that the average intensity of co-publication of re-
searchers that belong to the same laboratory is about 40 times higher than
the average co-publication intensity of those who belong to different labs,
if they are in the same city; and 100 times higher than the average inten-
sity between laboratories, if they are not in the same city. Drawing upon
77
a natural experiment arising from the process of labs relocation under-
gone by the University campus of Paris Jussieu between 1997 and 2014,
Catalini (2017) find that co-located labs are 3.5 times more likely to col-
laborate and more similar in the topics analysed and the references they
cite than separated ones.
Spatial proximity, however, is not always attainable. The ability of in-
dividual scientists of different nationalities to temporarily co-locate de-
pends heavily on such factors as travel barriers. The scrutiny of whether
and to what extent the imposition of visa restrictions affects the establish-
ment of international collaborations among researchers represents the
main object of this paper.
4.3 Visa restrictions and international research
collaborations
Over recent decades, the flow of capital, goods, people, and services
across national boundaries have grown noticeably (Held et al. (2000)).
At the same time, governments have had to face the trade-off between
entirely repealing the benefits of tourism, international trade, foreign in-
vestments, scientific, business, cultural and other exchanges on the one
hand and both addressing socio-political-security concerns and main-
taining control over illegal immigration on the other hand (Neumayer
(2006)). Visa restrictions appear to represent a policy instrument solu-
tion to the management of this complex trade-off: they allow govern-
ments to facilitate the cross-border movement of desirable people while
pre-screening and deterring the mobility of others who potentially pose a
threat to the security, wealth, and identity of a country. Deterrence can ei-
ther result from a visa-rejection decision or from people’s unwillingness
or impossibility to bear the additional (monetary and non-monetary)
costs a visa application process requires (Neumayer (2010)). The as-
sessment and quantification of the effects, both short- and long-term,
of imposing restrictive visa policy regimes on passport holders from in-
dividual countries have been the focus of a relatively recent strand of
research. Neumayer (2010) finds that visa restrictions reduce bilateral
78
travel by between 52 and 63 percent on average, with the effect being
stronger on travel to developing countries than to developed ones. Neu-
mayer (2011) employs a gravity-type model in a cross-sectional setting
and provides evidence of adverse effects on foreign direct investment
(FDI) and trade. He estimates a drop in FDI (trade) of up to 25 (19) per-
cent when one country unilaterally requires a visa from the nationals of
the other country. The effect on trade is still more considerable, going
up to around 28 percent, for states imposing restrictions on each other.
A similar-in-sign but even greater-in-magnitude impact of visas on ag-
gregate inbound tourist flows, a 70 percent reduction, was reported by
Lawson and Roychoudhury (2016). Appelt et al. (2015) identify a sub-
stantial deterrence effect of visas on bilateral international scientist flows
and on the number of cross-border research collaborations in 2004: bi-
lateral restrictions are found to reduce scientist flows (research collabo-
rations) by 34.5 (50) percent. Orazbayev (2017) also reports an almost 18
percent reduction in international knowledge flows - proxied by the av-
erage number of citations between pairs of countries over the 2005-2008
period - due to bilateral visa restrictions.
The cross-sectional nature of these studies, however, presents several
methodological shortcomings. Among others, results suffer from omit-
ted variable bias due to the impossibility of including dyadic, origin-time
and destination-time fixed effects and, thus, control for unobserved fac-
tors that might affect tourist flows, FDI, trade, scientist flows, research
collaborations and knowledge flows and might be potentially correlated
with the visa restriction variable. Czaika and Neumayer (2017) attempt
to address this issue. Drawing upon a panel of bilateral visa data cover-
ing 194 destinations and 214 origin countries over the 1995-2013 period,
they investigate the role of visa requirements on trade, FDI and tourism
through estimation of a gravity-type model specification that includes
a stringent set of fixed effects. Tourist inflows are reported to increase
by almost 25 percent after a visa removal and to decline by about 20
percent following a visa introduction; bilateral trade and FDI are also
hampered by visa restrictions, although to a lesser extent than suggested
by previous cross-sectional studies. Further, some of the deterred flows
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in tourists and goods and services are found to be spatially diverted to
alternative visa-free destinations, thereby creating positive externalities
for countries with more liberal visa policies. Czaika and Haas (2017) use
a panel of bilateral data covering 38 countries over the period 1973-2012
to investigate the impact of restrictive visa policy regimes on both migra-
tion and emigration dynamics. They find that visa requirements reduce
flows in either direction, encourage permanent settlement in the desti-
nation country, and lower migration’s responsiveness to fluctuations in
economic conditions in origin and destination countries. They also iden-
tify asymmetries in the way migration flows react to visa introductions
and removals: while removals cause an almost immediate increase in
migration movements, the (statistically significant) effects of visa intro-
ductions become visible after no less than five years.
Our paper contributes to this literature by assessing the potentially
detrimental effects of visa restrictions on the intensity of international re-
search collaborations between individual (co-authoring) researchers. We
extend the analysis in Orazbayev (2017) and Appelt et al. (2015) by a lon-
gitudinal dimension using a global scale panel data structure covering
the past four decades since the early 1970s for 194 x 214 country dyads
which allows a rigorous identification strategy and econometric specifi-
cation.
4.4 Data and some descriptive insights
Our analysis uses information on the volume and direction of interna-
tional scientific mobility and research collaborations on a global scale.
This information does not exist in any other format than bibliometric
data. Elsevier’s Scopus database is henceforth an ideal source of informa-
tion as it is one of the largest repositories of scientific publications adding
currently about three million new scientific articles, books, books chap-
ters and other documents every year (Czaika and Orazbayev (2018)). We,
therefore, consider information from this database to be a suitable source
for creating our two primary variables of interest. First, we can identify
the number of scientists moving between research institutions within
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and across countries by full names and institutional affiliation data of
all co-authors indicated in original scientific articles (Moed and Halevi
(2014); Moed et al. (2013)). This information enables tracking of research-
active scientists over time and across countries. An author who moves
from one institution to another in a different country and keeps on pub-
lishing enters our dataset as an international scientific migrant1. This
method allows capturing the direction (institution and country of ori-
gin and destination) and the volume of bilateral movements of research-
active scientists, i.e. those who have published at least one article in an
international journal listed in Elsevier’s Scopus database. It captures sci-
entific mobility after the first publication, which is in most cases during
or towards the end of a doctorate, or at the latest, in the early phase of a
post-doc.
Second, we use the same bibliometric data source also for identi-
fying international research collaborations between two (or more) re-
searchers based in different countries. Multiple studies have used co-
authorship and affiliation information as indicators of research collabo-
rations (Abramo (2012); Acedo (2006); Laband and Tollison (2000)), but
no evidence exists on the linkage between scientific mobility and the cre-
ation of collaborative scientific networks. From a methodological per-
spective, the combination of bibliometric data regarding collaboration
networks (i.e. co-authored scientific output) and scientific migration (i.e.
changing author affiliations) is unique and has the advantage of global
coverage over the past four decades since the early 1970s.
Figure 10 displays the emergence of global centres and peripheries of
scientific activity with Western Europe and North America as the domi-
nant regions of scientific production and collaboration. About two-thirds
of all scientific publications worldwide are written with at least one (co-
1If information on the country of affiliation is missing for any given year, then this in-
formation has been inferred based on past and future countries of affiliations basically us-
ing two approaches. The forward-fill approach assumes that an author did not change the
country of affiliation during research-inactive years, i.e. during the years without new pub-
lications; the backwards-fill approach assumes that the author changed the country of af-
filiation one year after the last identified affiliation. Once the information on each author’s
country of affiliation in every year was obtained, international migration was identified
and coded whenever the author changed the country of affiliation
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Figure 10: Number of international research collaboration (% total), 1973-
2013
)author from either Europe or North America reflecting the global im-
balances in scientific capacity and degree of international scientific par-
ticipation. However, this global pattern is continuously shifting towards
the Eastern hemisphere, with East Asia in particular, but also South-East
Asia, the Gulf region and Eastern Europe having the highest average
growth rates in the number of international collaborations (Figure 11).
The alleged catching-up process has accelerated during the recent two
decades, with countries in the Southern hemisphere playing a major role
in this assumed convergence process (Figure B7 in the appendix). Ap-
parently, these world regions started their growth process from a shal-
low level, which makes growth in absolute terms relatively modest. Re-
search institutes and universities in the Western hemisphere are still ac-
tors with their research staff being highly interconnected across borders
and between institutions. This interconnectedness reflects a high degree
of collaborative power leading to the top productivity in scientific out-
put. However, this dominance seems gradually shifting, or rather ex-
panding, towards institutions in the Near and the Far East which is also
reflected by the growing attractiveness of these regions for international
scientists (Czaika and Orazbayev (2018)).
Information on the existence of a mobility barrier between country
pairs comes from the recently established DEMIG (Determinants of In-
ternational Migration) VISA database, compiled at the International Mi-
gration Institute, University of Oxford, which covers 194 destination and
214 origin countries over the 1973 to 2013 period and is based on orig-
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Figure 11: Average Annual growth rates, 1973-2013
inal data from the Travel Information Manuals2 of the International Air
Transport Association (IATA). Dyadic (bilateral) visa policy is coded zero
if no visa for general travel purposes (e.g. tourism or social visits) is re-
quired for the targeted nationality, and one if a visa permit is required
for the respective passport holder.
We have re-coded information from this visa database and measure
visa restrictiveness as a discrete variable that takes on three values: 0
if there are no barriers to people’s mobility between two countries; 1 if
only a member of the pair imposes a restriction on movements from the
other (unilateral restriction); 2 if both countries of the pair hinder mo-
bility reciprocally (bilateral restriction). To control for possible asymme-
tries in the direction of a visa policy change, we further create two dum-
mies: visa introduction and visa removal. The former equals 1 when
the visa restriction variable switches from 0 to 2 or from 1 to 2, and 0
otherwise. Visa removal is equal to 1 when the visa restriction vari-
able switches from 2 to 1, or from 2 to 0, and 0 otherwise. Table 12
shows that in more than half of all dyad-year observations bilateral visas
were required, whereas only 13.03 percent were visa-free. We also re-
port 62492 occurrences of visa introductions versus 70708 visa removals:
2The IATA travel manuals are released on a monthly basis. The DEMIG VISA database
contains information on visa and exit requirements from 1973-2013 taken from the January
edition. The database does not distinguish between visa regulations for different lengths
of stay. Visa exemptions for holders of residence permits in the country of visa issuance or
other countries as well as diplomatic passports or other exemptions that are not for normal,
tourism-related purposes, are not considered. Likewise, the database does not distinguish
between visas that need to be applied for in advance and visas that can be granted upon
arrival in a country.
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more travel barriers have been removed than erected over the past four
decades, which underlines governments’ move towards more liberal poli-
cies to facilitate cross-border movements of people.
Table 12: Bilateral VISA policies
Variables Dyad-years Percentage
Absence of VISA restrictions 76851 13.03
Unilateral VISA restrictions 101295 17.18
Bilateral VISA restrictions 305969 51.89
Unobserved VISA restrictions 105494 17.90
TOTAL (non-missing) 484115 82.10
VISA introductions (incidences) 62492 10.6
VISA removals (incidences) 70708 11.99
Besides data on research collaborations and scientific mobility, we
collect information on dyad-specific contextual or structural variables
from CEPII’s database: bilateral nominal trade flows, bilateral distances,
dummy variables indicating whether the two countries of the dyad (i)
share a common official o primary language; (ii) have had a common
colonizer after 1945; (iii) share a common currency; and (iii) have ever
been in a colonial relationship. Bilateral distance, trade volumes and
the number of mobile scientists all enter our regressions in a logarithmic
form3. Summary statistics of all variables employed in the analysis are
displayed in Table 13.
4.5 Empirical strategy and findings
In addition to the analysis of how scientific migration and mobility drive
the evolution and dissemination of international research collaborations,
we test hypotheses on the relative importance of geographical, political,
cultural, and linguistic factors, and investigate whether visa policy re-
strictions work as mobility barrier indirectly shaping the directions and
3To avoid loss of observations, we add +1 to these count variables before taking the
logarithms.
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Research collaborations 18.04 212 0 24686 404568
VISA restrictions 1.473 0.753 0 2 484115
Log scientist mobility 0.498 1.054 0 8.705 224489
Log trade 11.09 7.104 0 26.67 459152
Log distance 8.746 0.763 4.107 9.892 582649
Common language 0.175 0.380 0 1 582649
Common colonizer 0.119 0.323 0 1 582649
Colonial relationship 0.0138 0.117 0 1 582649
Common currency 0.0127 0.112 0 1 582649
dynamics of international research collaborations4.
We identify visa effects by employing the most stringent economet-
ric specification that dyadic panel data allow, namely the inclusion of
dyad fixed effects in combination with time fixed effects that vary for
origin and destination country. Such a specification excludes the possi-
bility that unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across dyads, as well
as time-varying heterogeneity across countries, bias the estimated effects
(Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003); Baier and Bergstrand (2007)). Us-
ing a Pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) panel estimator, we
estimate a structural gravity-type model including time-invariant con-
textual variables before assessing the effect of scientific mobility and visa
restrictions in the most rigorous specification incorporating a full set of
country- and dyad-specific fixed effects which exclude any substantive
control variables:
lnRCijt = β1 + β2visaijt + β3lnsci mobilityijt + β4visaijt∗
∗lnsci mobilityijt + δ ∗Xij + ηij + γit + θjt + εijt
(4.1)
where lnRCijt is the natural log of dyadic research collaborations,
measured by the number of scientific publications co-authored by one
or more researchers from country i and country j in year t. visaijt is
4Policy variables have only recently been incorporated in quantitative tests on overall
migration flows (Czaika and Haas (2017); Mayda (2010); Ortega and Peri (2013)) or high-
skilled migration (Czaika and Parsons (2017)), and science policy (Publishing (2014)).
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a discrete variable that is coded depending on whether the dyad was
visa-free in both directions (0), bilaterally visa-constrained (2), or only
unilaterally constrained (1). The log of sci mobilityijt captures the num-
ber of research-active scientists moving from an institution in country i
to an institution in country j in year t. We also interact visa restrictions
visaijt with lnsci mobilityijt to identify whether the effect of scientific
mobility on the number of dyadic research collaborations is dependent
on the existence of mobility barriers. In addition to these key variables
of interest, we also control for other structural dyadic variables X in-
cluding geographical distance, colonial ties, common coloniser, common
language, common currency, and bilateral trade volume. We further
minimise the risk of an omitted variable bias, we include in our three-
dimensional panel data structure model the maximum number of dyadic
and country-time fixed effects, i.e. ηij representing dyad fixed effects, γit
and θjt capturing country-specific year fixed effects, and εijt as an id-
iosyncratic error term5. The identification assumption is that visaijt is
uncorrelated with the error term conditional on the dyad-specific, and
country-specific year fixed effects. The global coverage of our (unbal-
anced) dataset with 194 x 214 country pairs also minimises a potential
sample selection bias so that we have high confidence in the reliability
and validity of the identified estimates. The only possible bias may stem
from dyadic variation over time which may be correlated with either the
visa policy or the scientific mobility variables. This design eliminates all
other potential sources of bias.
Table 14 reports estimation outputs of gravity-type models with country-
year fixed effects (columns 1-5) and the most stringent set of fixed effects
(columns 6-7). Model 1 only includes the core set of contextual gravity
variables which by and large show the expected effects. Geographical
distance is a robust obstacle for international research collaborations; for
doubling distance between countries results in about 13 to 45 percent
less co-authored publications. Besides proximity, common language and
5The dyad fixed effects account for the time-invariant multilateral resistance, whereas
the country-specific year fixed effects account for time-varying multilateral resistance
(Bertoli and Moraga (2013)).
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colonial ties are other facilitating factors of international research collab-
orations. High connectivity and economic linkages between countries,
captured by the bilateral trade variable, is another structural factor en-
hancing other flows along the propositions of migration systems theory
(Kritz et al. (1992); Mabogunje (1970)). This implies that scientific con-
nections regarding research collaborations and scientific mobilities fol-
low existing structural pathways between countries.
Table 14: Determinants of international research collaborations: scientific
migration and VISA policies (PPML estimation)
DV: Research collaborations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log distance -0.450∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Common language 0.360∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.013 0.008 0.007
(0.018) (0.017) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Common colonizer 0.430∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.039) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Colonial relationship 0.236∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.019∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Common currency 0.034 -0.004 -0.027∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Log trade 0.165∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Log scientist migration 0.470∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Unilateral VISA restrictions -0.095∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗
(0.009) (0.018) (0.031)
Bilateral VISA restrictions -0.200∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.021) (0.038)
Unilateral*Log scientist migration 0.040∗∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Bilateral*Log scientist migration 0.068∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009)
Post-visa removal (time dummy) 0.043∗∗∗
(0.009)
Post-visa introduction (time dummy) -0.058∗∗∗
(0.013)
Observations 301575 277317 171000 153781 153781 154463 258458
R2 0.928 0.937 0.983 0.989 0.988 0.997 0.997
i-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
j-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
ij FE no no no no no yes yes
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Furthermore, across different specifications, scientific migration and
mobility show to be a significant and robust indicator and an explana-
tory factor of international co-authorships. A ten percent increase in
the number of mobile scientists is associated with a 5 to 45 percent in-
crease in bilateral research collaborations. The causality is not necessar-
ily only in one direction, but the two processes of scientific mobility and
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international research collaborations are mutually enhancing: scientific
movement precede, concur, and succeed international scientific collabo-
rations, and we do not attempt to disentangle these self-perpetuating ef-
fects working at different stages of international research collaboration.
This finding at the global macro level is supported by recent evidence
pointing to the interrelatedness of international mobility and collabora-
tive relationships in career trajectories of Indian academics (Czaika and
Toma (2017)).
Barriers to mobility in terms of visa restrictions are found to impact
negatively and statistically significantly the number of international re-
search collaborations. On average, uni-directed visa restrictions, i.e. visa
restrictions imposed only for nationals of one country of a dyad but not
retaliated by the other state, are associated with a 10 percent reduction
in research collaborations (column 4). Bi-directed visa restrictions, i.e.
nationals of both countries require a visa before entering the respective
country, have even a stronger effect of an about 20 percent difference
in the average number of research collaborations compared to ‘average’
visa-free country dyads6.
In columns (5) and (6) we include interaction terms of visa restriction
and the log of mobile scientists. The positive sign of these interaction
terms suggests that migration of scientists is more relevant for facilitating
international research collaborations in visa-constrained than visa-free
corridors. The combined size of β3 and β4 indicates growing importance
of existing scientific ties in situations where visa restrictions constrain
bilateral mobility. This combined effect also holds in model (6) where we
employ the most rigorous specification regarding the number of fixed
effects.
We finally test the existence of asymmetries in the direction of a visa
policy change. By identifying the years either after a visa introduction
or a visa removal, respectively, we can estimate the effect of a visa pol-
icy change in one or the other direction. We estimate these two parame-
6The effect size of these two estimates declines to 2.2 percent (uni-directed) and 7.9 per-
cent (bi-directed) in a model specification including the full set of country-year specific
and dyad-specific fixed effects. Results of this regression are not shown but available on
request.
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ters in a specification with full inclusion of all possible fixed effects. The
estimates measure the difference in the number of research collabora-
tions before and after a visa policy change. The estimated effects indicate
that visa policy changes work in the expected direction but are slightly
smaller than the visa policy estimates in the other models. We estimate
that on average a visa removal increases the number of research collab-
orations in the years after the policy change by about 4 percent, while
an introduction of a visa restrictions decreases the number of research
collaborations by on average almost 6 percent.
4.6 Conclusions
We report evidence of a strong deterrence effect from imposing visa re-
strictions on the number of international research collaborations. Trade,
as a proxy for economic interconnectedness among countries, spatial
proximity, and commonalities in terms of the language spoken or having
had a common colonizer, all are reported to affect collaborations among
scientists positively and significantly. Greater mobility of scientists is as-
sociated with a rising number of international co-authorship, although
we are aware that causality might move in the other direction, too.
Scientific migration and mobility may enhance the scientific output
by bringing in new ideas and experiences in different scientific areas
which in turn lead to knowledge creation and spillovers (Calderini and
Scellato (2005)). However, how and to what extent destination countries
and institutions benefit scientifically from the recruitment of researchers
from abroad remains unclear as it does not depend solely on the charac-
teristics and scientific prowess of the individual researcher, but also on
the capacity of the scientific and institutional environment to absorb re-
searchers. It is thus still an unresolved question to what extent in-coming
researchers create ’extra’ knowledge. Or, to what extent does knowledge
spill over to other (collaborating and non-collaborating) researchers?
The intermediating role of universities and research institutions is
also still unclear. Universities and research institutions are the organ-
isational entities, which provide the environment for self-determined
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arrangements for research collaborations (Kreiner and Schultz (1993);
Stichweh (1996)). Notwithstanding, scientists operate in broader insti-
tutional and social settings, and thus, the presence of specific activities
at the institutional, but also the state level is critical to support scientific
productivity and collaboration (Wagner et al. (2001)). For instance, there
is very little evidence on the role and effectiveness of public policies to
attract and select skilled migrants and researchers (Czaika and De Haas
(2013); Czaika and Parsons (2017)). Also, international research collabo-
rations are assumed to be driven by factors such as the scale of a research
budget (Bohen and Stiles (1998)), the duration of a research project (Jeong
et al. (2013)), academic excellence and prestige of research partners and
institutions (Wagner (2005)). However, these factors have never been
systematically assessed on a larger scale.
The link between scientific migration and mobility, on the one hand,
and international knowledge spill-over and dissemination, on the other,
is highly relevant regarding the effects of a scientific brain drain on the
scientific capacity and the extent to which scientific knowledge is feeding
back to origin countries. Whether, and under which conditions, scientific
migration and mobility generates benefits or constitutes a detrimental so-
called brain drain for origin countries and institutions depends largely
on the intensity of scientific collaboration and knowledge exchange be-
tween interconnected scientific communities in origin and destination
countries, in which mobile scientists bridge institutions and facilitate the




Table A1: Number of occupied housing units among members of the lan-
guage groups.
Total Italian German Ladin
Pre-1919 27251 4517 21562 1172
(0.166) (0.791) (0.043)
1919-1945 12631 7066 5141 424
(0.559) (0.407) (0.033)
1946-1960 23439 10806 11731 902
(0.461) (0.500) (0.038)
1961-1970 32133 13313 17545 1275
(0.414) (0.546) (0.040)
Note. Figures come from the 1981 Census of Population and Hous-
ing, pertain to all municipalities in the province of Bolzano and are
split according to the linguistic group of the housing units’ occu-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A4: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Against 968 33.47 15.98 0 90.51
Against1 968 45.84 18.64 4.255 100
Against2 968 48.62 18.99 3.390 100
Spatial lag 1421 33.24 2.397 29.83 36.79
Spatial lag 1 1421 44.48 1.985 40.68 46.31
Spatial lag 2 1421 47.03 2.017 43.74 49.85
Native 968 92.76 7.121 40 100
Male 968 47.58 6.193 21.17 80.00
Age 968 46.77 3.384 29.50 62.82
Rural 968 42.62 17.28 0 100
Politics 968 43.19 14.85 0 81.82
Safety 951 83.53 11.04 49.46 100
Trust 968 41.54 19.22 0 85.71
Education 968 74.30 14.93 6.901 100
Unemployment rate 946 9.097 5.717 1.700 37
Notes. Against, Against1, and Against2 stand for, respectively, hostile attitudes to-
wards: immigrants of the same race or ethnicity; immigrants of different race or






























































































































































































































































































































































Table A6: Shares of respondents with negative attitudes towards different
types of immigrants: minimum and maximum values
SAME race DIFFERENT race POOR, NON-EUROPEAN
Country or ethnicity or ethnicity immigrants
min max min max min max
Austria 9.471 61.285 35 73.544 36.095 75.434
Belgium 10.909 38.788 24.848 55 23.529 58.108
Bulgaria 12.764 36.846 24.841 48.073 27.262 63.825
Croatia 32.246 37.824 36.848 44.510 41.253 45.403
Cyprus 19.799 65.545 87.540 89.652 91.032 92.495
Czech Republic 29.070 65.882 41.506 77.995 42.240 81.070
Denmark 7.672 25.333 26.136 54.545 40 62.069
Estonia 27.970 41.525 53.058 65.750 67.513 75.164
Finland 14.286 46.154 14.286 65.368 21.429 73.377
France 13.629 60.739 25.653 71.134 26.150 76.561
Greece 33.566 90.511 64.336 100 60.839 100
Hungary 28.049 63.014 65.513 91.071 72.689 95.851
Iceland 6.413 10.229 25.373 33.511 24.447 31.720
Ireland 19.514 48.913 28.046 54.826 32.200 67.818
Italy 0 58.824 18.156 80 9.590 61.111
Latvia 44.962 44.962 62.671 62.671 75.497 75.497
Lithuania 19.131 28.089 29.295 41.179 41.428 60.283
Luxembourg 32.164 42.081 51.577 53.826 51.037 52.854
Netherlands 18.939 60.869 22.727 65.217 34.351 68.852
Norway 12.113 33.693 18.644 51.111 26.829 49.258
Poland 6.549 46.569 16.468 63.401 11.956 69.157
Portugal 23.222 75.784 31.304 89.603 40.529 87.035
Romania 21.377 51.809 32.732 58.445 33.833 62.655
Slovakia 13.571 51.393 24.286 63.164 27.465 73.953
Slovenia 23.218 43.199 29.448 50.820 38.412 55.025
Spain 0 85.329 12.827 85.329 12.827 100
Sweden 2.885 17.526 4.255 23.626 3.390 29.412
Switzerland 8.584 32.247 19.174 52.734 18.840 67.347
Notes. Min and max denote, respectively, the minimum and maximum shares of respondents with negative attitudes
towards different types of immigrants within each country over the 2002-2014 period. For instance, with reference to
Austria, the share of those who are against immigrants of the same race or ethnic group ranges between 9.47% (minimum
value recorded in an Austrian region at a specific time) and 61.28% (maximum value recorded in another (or the same)
Austrian region at a specific time).
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Table A7: NUTS2-level differences in anti-immigrant attitudes between
2002 and 2014
Differences in anti-immigrant attitudes
Country NUTS2 region SAME race DIFFERENT POORER countries
or ethnicity race or ethnicity outside Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Burgenland -26.808 -13.876 -20.076
Niederösterreich -25.458 -22.844 -13.343
Wien -27.286 -17.280 -9.752
Kärnten -5.839 2.989 5.490
Austria Steiermark -31.482 -19.232 -5.268
Oberösterreich -9.357 -10.694 0.770
Salzburg -47.977 -29.949 -25.097
Tyrol -20.184 -17.005 -14.240
Vorarlberg -18.231 -16.069 -3.203
Prague 33.430 35.037 36.115
Středn Čechy 17.866 25.362 32.331
Jihozápad 8.070 11.520 11.974
Czech Republic Severozápad 3.908 19.043 27.326
Severovýchod 7.026 15.704 20.682
Jihovýchod 5.996 12.561 23.444
Středn Morava 14.899 19.475 18.977
Moravskoslezsko 19.933 20.747 23.042
Denmark Hovedstaden -9.571 -14.001 -0.557
Sjælland -4.341 -8.697 1.421
Közép-Magyarország 9.654 1.514 7.352
Közép-Dunántúl -19.700 -8.896 -5.962
Nyugat-Dunántúl 18.966 -10.720 -12.302
Hungary Dél-Dunántúl -9.708 1.083 4.128
Észak-Magyarország -8.207 -4.344 -7.541
Észak-Alföld -13.203 -8.291 1.723
Dél-Alföld -10.478 -16.071 -5.672
Ireland Border, Midland and Western 29.399 17.823 27.036
Southern and Eastern 12.102 9.752 18.161
Groningen -6.795 -5.627 2.696
Friesland -15.591 -17.712 -12.413
Drenthe -9.771 -18.618 4.329
Overijssel -0.929 -3.503 5.375
Gelderland -5.529 -8.338 3.877
The Netherlands Flevoland -6.768 -11.615 3.169
Utrecht -8.763 -11.289 4.344
North Holland -5.892 -6.740 2.906
South Holland -14.954 -14.361 -0.377
Zeeland 4.476 11.016 21.158
North Brabant -15.151 -16.862 -3.890
Limburg -2.067 4.461 18.258
Oslo og Akershus -7.094 -18.280 -4.449
Hedmark og Oppland -12.481 -24.264 -10.568
Sør-Østlandet -12.886 -19.349 -3.488
Norway Agder og Rogaland -11.164 -16.883 -2.387
Vestlandet -13.747 -21.504 -12.030
Trøndelag -17.625 -24.339 -5.567
Nord-Norge -11.198 -14.281 -5.409
(Continued)
97
Table A7: NUTS2-level differences in anti-immigrant attitudes between
2002 and 2014 (continued)
Differences in anti-immigrant attitudes
Country NUTS2 region SAME race DIFFERENT POORER countries
or ethnicity race or ethnicity outside Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Łódzkie -1.124 -2.645 9.156
Mazowieckie -5.516 -8.487 3.897
Małopolskie -6.721 -8.466 6.057
Ślaskie 0.412 -0.850 6.762
Lubelskie 3.118 8.395 11.945
Podkarpackie 2.076 -4.801 10.127
Świetokrzyskie -14.819 -13.886 -15.920
Poland Podlaskie 18.060 6.585 15.417
Wielkopolskie 0.696 -0.300 -1.763
Zachodniopomorskie -15.250 -9.780 -8.642
Lubuskie 14.585 9.795 20.521
Dolnoślaskie -0.350 -2.096 6.742
Opolskie 2.921 1.299 -4.348
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 3.770 11.134 6.962
Warmińsko-Mazurskie 8.696 7.884 5.741
Pomorskie -15.803 -15.294 -11.399
Slovenia Vzhodna Slovenija -13.114 -6.962 4.035
Zahodna Slovenija -4.025 -9.341 4.504
Galicia -20.270 -23.428 -22.800
Asturias 23.710 25.751 25.595
Cantabria -38.490 -17.748 -20.668
Basque Community 12.087 15.797 21.608
Navarre 10.649 8.304 -2.639
La Rioja -12.534 16.438 1.765
Aragon 3.880 5.309 -0.833
Madrid -16.580 -13.413 -9.437
Spain Castile-Leon -12.940 -22.096 -13.494
Castile-La Mancha -26.961 -25.616 -27.720
Extremadura 33.014 25.346 32.382
Catalonia -11.101 -5.241 -5.443
Valencian Community -32.415 -26.961 -25.131
Balearic Islands 19.405 28.508 18.567
Andalusia 10.398 13.451 9.106
Region of Murcia 12.111 24.382 14.068
Canary Islands -1.320 -10.672 -10.352
Stockholm -1.887 -4.569 -3.059
Östra Mellansverige -6.297 -8.890 -1.391
Småland med öarna -1.926 -6.300 -0.735
Sweden Sydsverige -7.174 -10.937 -1.437
Västsverige -7.285 -11.191 -1.859
Norra Mellansverige -12.296 -15.302 -8.040
Mellersta Norrland -6.332 -10.030 2.189
Övre Norrland -0.949 -6.527 -3.109
(Continued)
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Table A7: NUTS2-level differences in anti-immigrant attitudes between
2002 and 2014 (continued)
Differences in anti-immigrant attitudes
Country NUTS2 region SAME race DIFFERENT POORER countries
or ethnicity race or ethnicity outside Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Genferseeregion -0.124 7.249 12.460
Espace Mittelland 0.698 5.506 12.180
Switzerland Ostschweiz -8.945 -3.215 12.447
Zentralschweiz -1.578 9.160 29.714
Tessin 8.335 13.747 24.489
Notes. The table reports only the NUTS2 regions where data were available both in 2002 and in 2014. The following
countries (with all, if not specified, or some regions, if specified) are not included in the table but are part of the estimation
sample: Belgium (ESS 5-7); Bulgaria (ESS 3-6), Croatia (ESS 4-5); Cyprus (ESS 3-6), Denmark (Southern Denmark (DK03),
Midtiylland (DK04) and Nordiylland (DK05): ESS 4-7), Estonia (ESS 2-7), Finland (ESS 5-7, excluded South Finland (FI1C)
and Aland (FI20) for which data were available for rounds 6 and 7); France (ESS 5-7); Greece (ESS 1, 2 and 5); Iceland (ESS
2-6); Italy (ESS 1-2 and 6, excluded Valle D’Aosta (ITC2) for which data were available only for round 1 and Provincia
Autonoma di Bolzano (ITH1),), Provincia Autonoma di Trento (ITH2), Emilia-Romagna (ITH5), and Marche (ITI3) for
which data were available only for round 6); Latvia (ESS 4); Lithuania (ESS 5-7); Luxembourg (ESS 1-2); Portugal (ESS 4-7);
Romania (ESS 4); Slovakia (ESS 2-6); Spain (Ceuta (ESS 3, 6 amd 7) and Melilla (ESS 4, 5 and 7); Switzerland (Grossregion
Nordwestschweiz (CH03) and Zurich (CH04): ESS 2-7). Lastly, the following regions are not part of the estimation sample:
Molise (ITF2), Regiao Autonoma dos Aores (PT20), Regiao Autonoma de Madeira (PT30), Corsica (FR83), Guadeloupe





(a) Before (b) After
Figure B1: The Italianization of South Tyrol during the Fascist regime. Re-
shaping of the museum building in Bolzano. (source: Fingeller, 1938).
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(a) No German allowed on
gravestones
(b) Scratching reliefs from
Tyrolean monuments
(c) Erecting Italian monu-
ments
Figure B2: The Italianization of South Tyrol during the Fascist regime.
(source: Fingeller, 1938).
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Figure B4: Number of terroristic attacks in South Tyrol between 1956 and
1972.
Figure B5: Spatial distribution of the terroristic attacks in South Tyrol be-
tween 1956 and 1972.
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Figure B6: Average attitudes towards immigrants from POORER coun-
tries OUTSIDE Europe. Lichtenstein, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Malta
- black-highlighted - do not participate in the ESS survey. There are miss-
ing data also for the French Corsica region. Only data for one round are
available for the following: 5 Italian regions (Molise, Provincia Autonoma di
Trento, Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, Emilia-Romagna, and Marche), and all
the regions of Romania and Latvia (due to unavailability of design weights
for ESS round 3). Since the ESS provides no NUTS2 level classification for
Germany, Turkey, and United Kingdom, the related averages are computed
based on NUTS1 data.
Figure B7: Average Annual growth rates, 1993-2013.
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Williams, A. M., Baláž, V., and Wallace, C. (2004). International labour mobility
and uneven regional development in europe: human capital, knowledge and
entrepreneurship. European Urban and Regional Studies, 11(1):27–46. 76
Wuchty, S., Jones, B. F., and Uzzi, B. (2007). The increasing dominance of teams
in production of knowledge. Science, 316(5827):1036–1039. 76, 77
Zelinsky, W. (1971). The hypothesis of the mobility transition. Geographical review,
pages 219–249. 75

Unless otherwise expressly stated, all original material of whatever
nature created by Armando Di Lillo and included in this thesis,
is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial
Share Alike 2.5 Italy License.
Check creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/it/ for the legal
code of the full license.
Ask the author about other uses.
